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Abstract 
A major shift toward open source software is underway.  Companies are more 
critically evaluating the cost effectiveness of their IT investments, seeing the benefits of 
collaborative development, and looking for ways to avoid vendor lock-in.  At the same 
time, academics and industry visionaries are criticizing the use of a traditional 
appropriation mechanism for innovation—the patent—by bemoaning the decisions of 
U.S. and foreign governments to permit software patents, the rising numbers of patents 
on software-related innovations (the so-called “arms race” build-up), and the cost and 
frequency of patent litigation in the software industry.  The critics generally have 
applauded the shift towards open source, albeit for somewhat varying reasons. 
This paper responds to those trends by analyzing the role of property rights in the 
open source model, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of the appropriation 
mechanisms that the open source model uses in lieu of intellectual property rights.  I 
make two main points.  First, I argue that open source’s commercial success is 
intertwined with its incorporation into traditional commercial value chains.  What that 
means is that open source cannot continue to grow in commercial importance without the 
property rights that are necessary for firms to profit at other points of the value chain.  
Second, I argue that despite open source’s distributed development process, open source 
in the real world is likely to support an increasing concentration in the software industry.  
The reason is that the proprietary firms best situated to exploit commercial interactions 
with open source will be large firms, particularly large services firms.  Smaller firms will 
be less successful as services firms, and far less successful at exploiting the value-chain 
interactions that have driven commercial open source. 
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COMMERCIALIZING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE:
DO PROPERTY RIGHTS STILL MATTER?
I. Introduction 
For several years now, open source software products have been gaining 
prominence and market share.  Yet it is not the products themselves that are provocative, 
but the way in which they are developed and distributed.  Two related features of the 
model are distinctive: the use of collaborative development structures not contained 
within the boundaries of a single firm, and the lack of reliance on intellectual property 
rights as a means of appropriating the value of the underlying innovations.  Firm-level 
control of property is replaced by a complex set of informal and (sometimes) contractual 
relations among strategic partners not joined by traditional firm boundaries.  I argue here 
that those relations reflect not coalescence towards industry norms driven solely by 
superior output, but rather a series of strategic moves and countermoves that have had the 
effect of opening some markets but closing others, substantially reducing profit margins, 
and fostering consolidation of a traditionally fragmented industry. 
I have written elsewhere about the role of intellectual property rights in 
proprietary models of software development, where intellectual property rights are used 
(albeit somewhat ineffectively) by firms to exploit the value of their internal R&D 
investments.  In that work, I generally reject the idea that the sheer number of patents is 
creating a thicket that deters innovation, largely because of the positive evidence of a 
robust startup market and because of the lack of evidence of any chilling of investment.  
More generally, I have argued that many of the criticisms of software patents fail to 
account for the apparent benefits those patents provide to smaller firms and focus much 
too heavily on the transaction costs associated with the massive patent portfolios that the 
larger industry participants have acquired (the so-called “arms race” build up).1
Open source development models work differently.  Because open source 
development proceeds on the premise that no individual or firm will have proprietary 
control of the software, the firms participating in those development projects might have 
little need for patents.  The cooperative nature of development obviates any need for the 
actual and implicit cross licensing that provides access to technology throughout the 
proprietary software sector.  The problem, however, is that the open source community 
does not exist in a vacuum.  It exists in a world in which participants in the industry are 
building up large portfolios of patents, portfolios that pose a serious threat to open source 
development.  Therefore, any thorough analysis of the role of patents in the industry must 
take account of the effects of the current property rights system on all participants.  This 
essay takes up that issue.  
 
1 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 Texas L. Rev. 961 (2005); 
Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Startups (unpublished 2005 
manuscript). 
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In a nutshell, the problem is that open source developers can (and often do) 
operate outside of the IP licensing framework that dominates the software industry.  
Thus, many participants have no patents of their own with which they might protect 
themselves in IP litigation.  At the same time, at least some portions of this community 
have developed software with a cavalier attitude to the possibility of patent infringement.  
Those two habits cannot coexist in the long run.  If the existing legal framework is not to 
be abandoned, then the major open source developers must acquire patents of their own 
or they must gain shelter from the patent portfolios held by those that participate in the 
proprietary structure. 
That raises the question, in turn, whether the potential for high-quality software 
development through the open source model justifies eradication of software patents for 
the entire software industry.  To put it another way, one potential cost of permitting ready 
enforcement of software patents is the potential disabling of the open source model.  At 
the same time, a sensible policy analysis must consider the possibilities for the 
entrepreneurs and small firms struggling to find a foothold in the industry.  Because the 
property rights that patents offer are closely connected with the survival and success of 
those firms, we must look more closely at the role property rights play in open source 
before deciding that the need to free open source from the constraints of patents justifies 
abandoning patents in the industry entirely.  Yet it is difficult to analyze that problem 
definitively in the absence of any objective evidence that would quantify the benefits of 
open source development or the benefits that the commercial software industry derives 
from IP. 
The problem becomes more difficult when one considers the rapid convergence of 
commercial and open source licensing models—so that even proprietary companies now 
often allow access to source code2 and the prominent open source licenses discussed 
below regularly permit commercial development of proprietary works derived from the 
covered products.  A complete answer must account for the effects of those licenses on 
the character of financial investment in open source software.  For example, as I discuss 
below, the restrictions in common open source licenses might tend to tilt the scales in 
favor of proprietary investments in service firms rather than products firms.  If, as seems 
likely, it is more difficult for startups entering the industry to compete in services sectors 
than in product sectors, this suggests in turn that the spread of open source software in 
fact could promote concentration in the software industry. 
In this essay, I analyze the role of patent rights in commercialized open source 
development models—that is, development models that are part of business models 
centered on increasing shareholder returns.  Section II sets the stage with a brief 
description of the landscape of the industry and of the licenses on which open source 
development depends.  Section III considers open source as a challenge to the “one-shop” 
model of proprietary software development, explaining how and why firms in some cases 
might profit from collaborative development through open source instead of wholly one-
shop proprietary development.  Finally, Section IV considers the relation between open 
 
2 For Microsoft’s program, see http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/default.mspx.
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source and the direction and location of innovation in the industry.  I write from the 
perspective that open source will tend to support innovation by larger and better-
established firms than wholly proprietary development, which is a model that is at least 
relatively more accessible to startup and younger firms. 
A Note on Sources 
My account of the industry is based on four sources.  The first three are publicly 
available.  First, I have reviewed the existing literature, which includes several serious 
efforts to analyze the industry.3 Second, I have read widely in news accounts related to 
the open source community.  Third, to understand how the licenses in the industry 
actually work, I have studied the texts of the actual licenses with considerable care.  
Although some scholars have noted the important distinctions in these licenses,4 the 
literature generally has failed to consider a link between the specific terms of licenses and 
the business models that are best suited to using those licenses. 
The most important source, however, has been a series of in-depth interviews and 
site visits at a variety of large and small firms engaged with the open source development 
model.  I have spoken with executives at firms as large as IBM and Microsoft, and also at 
smaller startup firms and venture capitalists.  Because of the sensitive nature of the topics 
addressed in these interviews, I have adopted a different technique for collecting 
information than in my previous work.  Specifically, contrary to my normal practice, I 
did not tape or transcribe the interviews, but rather limited myself to detailed 
contemporaneous notes.  I was free to ask any questions I liked.  Because of the sensitive 
nature of the topics at issue here, and because I thought it important to obtain access to 
frank opinions from executives at large companies, I adopted a much more restrictive 
framework than has been customary in the interviews for my earlier work.  Specifically, 
the interviews for this project were conducted on the understanding that (I) I would not 
identify the specific individuals to whom I spoke; (II) I would emphasize that the 
interviewees expressed their personal views rather than the views of the firms by which 
they were employed (I emphasize that point here); (III) my notes of the conversations 
would remain confidential; and (IV) I would not attribute any specific quotations to 
employees of a particular firm.  Because several of the firms were generous enough to 
give me access to high-ranking executives with decision-making authority related to the 
subject, I believe that the information from those interviews is uniquely valuable in 
developing a nuanced understanding of the relation between proprietary and open source 
 
3 For my purposes, the most noteworthy are Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source (2004); Lawrence 
Rosen, Open Source Licensing: Software Freedom and Intellectual Property Law (2004); Josh Lerner & 
Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond (Harvard NOM Research 
Paper No. 04-35); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, forthcoming J. L. & 
Econ. (2005) [hereinafter Lerner & Tirole, Scope of Licensing]; Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in 
the Public Domain, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183  (2004); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and 
Intellectual Property Policy, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 534 (2003). 
4 Particularly Rosen, supra note 3, Weber, supra note 3, and Ieuan G. Mahony & Edward J. Naughton, 
Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and into Big Business, Computer & Internet Lawy., 
Oct. 2004, at 1. 
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methods of development.  I am confident that I would not have been able to obtain that 
information by surveys or by formal on-the-record interviews. 
Of course, this does raise the possibility of bias, either in reporting the 
information from my notes or in selecting firms for interviews.  For this type of project, 
perhaps the most that can be said is that I was sensitive to those problems as I reviewed 
my notes in preparing this manuscript and selected the interview base.  In the end, 
however difficult it might be to replicate this information, I think it is fair to say that it 
does fall squarely within the relevant methodological tradition in the social sciences.  
Thus, I think the concerns with replicability go to the weight to be ascribed to the 
information, rather than its usefulness or validity.5
II. The Landscape 
A basic understanding of the development and current state of the software 
industry provides a necessary backdrop to the analytical questions on which this essay 
focuses.  Thus, I start with a broad outline of each model and the core terms of the 
licenses that shape them. 
A. The Proprietary Software Model 
1.  Formation and Maturation of the Proprietary Software Industry 
The software industry formed in the mid-1960s when labor shortages made it 
increasingly difficult for increasingly complex software to be produced in-house by each 
computer user as needed.6 Sales of software products grew rapidly throughout the 1970s, 
and by the 1980s, the United States had a large and well-developed software industry 
with more than one thousand firms.7
The industry is comprised of two sectors: products and services.8 The products 
sector further divides into primarily two markets, one for sales to individuals and the 
other to businesses (called enterprise software).9 The enterprise software market, in turn, 
 
5 For general discussion of this sort of qualitative empirical methodology, see Irving Seidman, 
Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences (2d 
ed. 1998); Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed. 2002). 
6 Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software 
Industry (2003). 
7 Campbell-Kelly, supra note 6; Michael A. Cusumano, The Business of Software (2004); Vernon W. 
Ruttan, Technology, Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation Perspective (2001) 
8 Although the general distinction between products and services firms draws on Cusumano, supra note 7, 
the further breakdown in this paragraph is my own. 
9 A small number of products firms earn revenues in other ways.  For example, firms that develop search 
technology typically rely heavily on advertising revenues. 
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includes products aimed at software designers and developers,10 products targeted 
directly to end users,11 and products targeted to hardware developers.12 The services 
sector is less structured and includes everything from outsourcing the entire IT function, 
to maintenance contracts, to custom software design, to hosted applications delivered via 
a web browser.  In the last case, the main difference from the license of a prepackaged 
software product may be that between an upfront license fee and a periodic rental or 
access fee. 
Though firms in the two sectors rely on substantially different business models, 
the line that separates them is a shifting one.  To simplify a complex pattern, it is 
reasonably accurate to say that products firms are characterized by higher operating 
margins, higher growth rates, and less stable market shares, whereas services firms have 
lower operating margins and lower growth rates, but can more readily establish stable 
market positions.13 From that perspective, the typical products firm is characterized by 
high-volume sales of non-customized products that customers can use “off the shelf” with 
little or no assistance.  At the other end of the spectrum are services firms, which generate 
revenues by helping firms to install, design, and maintain software.  In between is a large 
group of hybrid firms, which generally started by attempting to sell products, but were 
subsequently forced by market conditions to provide ever-increasing levels of 
customization, thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a pure high-margin 
product.14 
As a whole, a remarkable lack of concentration characterizes the software 
industry.  The industry’s CR4 ratio is only 39%, and its HHI is less than 600 (where an 
HHI of 1000 or more qualifies an industry as only moderately concentrated).15 Census 
Bureau statistics report more than forty thousand firms in the industry as of 2000.16 
10 Examples would include web development tools, graphics tools, server software, operating systems, 
firmware and many others. 
11 These products are likely to be marketed through value-added resellers, channel distributors, system 
integrators, or independent vendors, and include database programs, office suites, and various vertical 
industry applications. 
12 Examples here would include the various operating systems and simpler programs developed for 
integration into the increasingly varied array of electronic devices that rely on computer processing. 
13 Also, as I show in a forthcoming paper with John Allison and Abe Dunn, products firms are more likely 
to use patents than services firms. 
14 This paragraph summarizes the basic argument of Cusumano, supra note 7. 
15 The industry “CR4” is the “concentration ratio” of, or percentage of total market sales accounted for by, 
the top 4 software firms.  The HHI measures concentration by summing the squares of the individual 
market shares of all participants.  These figures are calculated based on the 2002 software sales figures for 
the Software 500.  They overstate industry concentration to the extent that they ignore software sales by 
firms outside the Software 500.  Conversely, concentration figures would be much higher if the industry 
were broken down into smaller sectors. 
16 I aggregate data from NAICS 5112 (Software Publishers) and 541511 (Custom Computer Programming 
Services).  The data are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E54151.HTM and 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E5112.HTM (both last visited on Oct. 7, 2003). 
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Nearly five hundred firms in the industry had a million or more dollars in sales in 2003, 
even after the contractions in the industry at the turn of the millennium.17 As I discuss in 
Section IV, the lack of concentration has considerable implications for the competitive 
structure of the industry and its openness to innovation. 
The lack of concentration is attributable largely to low barriers to entry.  Firms 
typically enter and exit with great frequency.18 This pattern interacts in a distinct way 
with the sector designations described above.  As the venture capital model that supports 
most new firms that enter the industry better suits products firms than service firms,19 
products firms are more likely to be the startups receiving financing.  New services firms, 
although not unheard of, are less common and tend to evolve naturally from incumbent or 
rising product firms adapting to market pressures. 
2. Software Licensing under Proprietary Models 
An important feature of the evolutionary tension between products firms and 
services firms is the treatment of source code.  Traditionally, hybrid or services firms that 
sold custom-designed products provided the source code to the user, but with restrictions 
designed to prevent its further disclosure.  However, for prepackaged products, until 
about 1990, standard license agreements generally did not make the source code available 
at all.  This led to an increasing compatibility problem between software and hardware 
components because other software developers did not have access to each other’s source 
code.20 
The rise of the Internet and network computing, both of which have increased the 
technical complexity of software by orders of magnitude, exacerbated the interoperability 
problem.  This is particularly true for infrastructure and enterprise products, as opposed 
to end-user applications, which tend to be easier to install).  The commoditization of 
“middleware” products,21 which made custom software less dominant in that space, also 
drove the importance of easy compatibility; it is difficult to sell a commodity that does 
not easily interact with commodity products that provide associated functionality.  The 
complexity underscored the need for transparency in software design, as many 
 
17 http://www.softwaremag.com/sw500 (last visited May 6, 2004). 
18 In 2002, 209 firms received their first round of venture capital financing, receiving a combined total of 
$872 million (an average of more than $4 million for each firm) during a markedly down year.  During 
2002, 652 software companies received a total of $4.3 billion (that is, 443 firms received second or 
subsequent rounds during 2002).  Since 1995, 2907 new firms have received venture capital financing.  
2003 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 40.  Similarly, the industry’s index of substantial 
operating firms (the Software 500) shows a major turnover each year: there have been about 1100 distinct 
firms in the Software 500 in the last five years.   
19 Mann & Sager, supra note 1; see also Cusumano, supra note 7. 
20 This paragraph and the paragraphs that follow reflect background information derived from 
conversations with software executives over the last several years. 
21 By middleware, I refer loosely to software that operates as an intermediary between different 
applications, such as web servers, applications servers, database management systems, and the like. 
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sophisticated users increasingly began to desire not only a functional software product 
but also a product that users might be able to understand, replicate, and modify. 
Thus, there is a strong market-based need for collaboration in the development of 
“platform” products, which serve as the backbone of a user’s entire system.  Although 
there obviously was competition among firms to own the “platform,”22 a one-firm 
platform would present the long-term problem of slowed technological innovation, as that 
firm’s interests naturally would conflict with those of the other firms attempting to 
provide products and services on the platform. 
Theoretically, a workable method for top-down articulation of platform standards 
or interfaces could have sidestepped the problem.  That has not happened, however.  One 
central difficulty is that the industry has not been able to reach a consensus on the relation 
between patents and standards.  Some groups advocate the adoption of standards that will 
reliably be patent-free, hoping to avoid the possibility that a patentee can tax any 
substantial portion of standard-based Internet activity.  As it happens, however, patented 
technology has been knowingly adopted into standards in some cases, and there have 
been several notable incidents where patents were discovered after a standard was 
implemented.23 
Others advocate the mandatory licensing of intellectual property rights 
incorporated into standards.  They recognize the difficulty (which should be clear from 
the discussion below) of establishing a property-preempted zone in which to articulate 
standards.  Even on that issue, however, stakeholders dispute whether the licenses, 
besides being “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND), must also be royalty free.  
The most prominent organization, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), has 
generally taken the view that those that participate in a standards process must contribute 
their patents royalty-free.24 That approach, however, has the potential to drive patentees 
from the process, which in turn could deprive the resulting standards of the best 
technology available.  Moreover, if the adopted standard turns out to infringe an essential 
patent of a departed patentee, then that party could refuse to license its patent entirely or 
impose unreasonable terms and conditions on those seeking to implement the standard.  
Thus, many patentees in the industry instead insist that a better approach is to permit a 
 
22 For a theoretical discussion of the economics of that problem, see Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in 
Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615 (2000).  It is a common topic of competitive 
concern among the executives to whom I have spoken. 
23 Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards: The Risks to 
Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 95 (2002). 
24 For discussion, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 303-11.  OASIS recently revised its patent policy to 
accommodate but not require royalty-free licenses.  (http://www.oasis-
open.org/who/intellectualproperty.php).  Even the W3C policy permits royalties through an “opt-out” 
provision.  See http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205 (section 7). 
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standard to incorporate patents licensed on a RAND basis even if it is not fully royalty-
free.25 
More recently, cost pressures have given open-source products an important 
market entry point.  To date, that entry point has been in the commercial market, for 
several reasons.  Among other things, those products are attractive because of their ability 
(discussed in more detail below) to facilitate lower hardware costs by preventing vendor 
lock-in.26 It is also certainly important that sophisticated enterprises are more willing to 
take a risk on a potentially complex installation and integration process.27 The early 
dissemination and widespread adoption of Linux and Apache – both free and of 
demonstrated quality – exemplified these bases for accepting open source products.  In 
contrast, open source has made much more limited inroads in the consumer space.  This 
is true, at least in part, because Microsoft’s existing products are much less risky for the 
typical consumer to install and integrate, yet still offer considerable quality in comparison 
to existing open-source alternatives. 
 
25 This paragraph and the preceding one summarize the views of executives in interviews by the author. 
26 See Eric S. Raymond, The Magic Cauldron (2000), available at 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/magic-cauldron/index.html.
27 A point emphasized in interviews. 
Open Source and Property Rights February 16, 2006 Draft 9
9
3. Cross-Licensing: the Proprietary Equilibrium 
 As I have explained elsewhere,28 the widespread use of cross licensing of patented 
technologies is a key feature of the mature proprietary software development model.  The 
increasing complexity and interdependence of innovation in the industry has made it 
important for all of the major firms to have access to the intellectual property of the other 
major firms in the industry.  It is likely that many of the most important firms are 
developing and selling products that at least arguably infringe in some way on patents 
held by several other major players in the industry.  The major firms could test the 
relative strengths of their portfolio through litigation, but instead have chosen for the 
most part to enter into a web of cross-licensing agreements.  Under those agreements 
(whether formal and explicit or informal and tacit), most of the large firms generally have 
access to all of the intellectual property held by most of the other large firms.  Thus, those 
firms for the most part compete against each other based on the strength of their product 
design and marketing, not on the strength of their IP portfolios.29 
B. The Open Source Development Model 
1. The Rise of Open Source 
One development mitigating the tension created by the proprietary licensing 
model (i.e., the demand/need for source code and resistance to providing it) has been the 
rise of platform products that are distributed with their source code.  Given the practical 
difficulties of distributing source code with products in a way that ensures that the code 
will remain confidential, it is perhaps not surprising that the source code is made 
available not only to the paying users but also to other developers and users at large. 
To understand the property rights at issue, it is important to distinguish two stages 
of an open source project.  First, in the contribution stage, dispersed communities of 
programmers produce lines of code that they contribute to a particular development 
project.  Typically, the copyright in the contributed code rests either with the contributor 
or with one of several non-profit entities (such as the Free Software Foundation) that 
acquires the copyright through assignment.  Where the copyright is not assigned, the 
contributor typically licenses the code to the project under the relevant license.30 Second, 
in the distribution stage, the software product is distributed under the terms of an open 
 
28 Mann, supra note 1. 
29 The strength of the IP portfolios is not irrelevant.  IBM, for instance, earns a great deal from licensing 
fees of its portfolio, which plainly is the strongest in the industry.  Thus, other firms have an incentive to 
increase the strength of their portfolios to lower the net sums they must expend on cross-licensing 
agreements.  This effect, however, is relatively indirect, largely because most of the cross-licensing 
agreements apparently do not involve a transfer of monetary consideration.  {The agreements are 
proprietary, but interviews my suggest (with the notable exception of IBM) the general lack of monetary 
consideration.} 
30 As discussed below, this can create difficulties when those operating the project later wish to alter the 
license under which the product is distributed (to “reversion” it, in the typical jargon), because they are 
likely to need consent from original contributors. 
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source license.  This license restricts the rights of the user in the code (more on that 
subject in the sections that follow).  If the leaders of the project wish for the software to 
be regarded as “open source,” they must select a form of license certified as an open 
source license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).31 
As a method of software production, open source in fact dates to the earliest days 
of commercial computing, when businesses using IBM computers in the early 1950’s 
collaborated on the task of designing software for their machines.32 The modern history 
of open source, however, begins with the birth of UNIX in 1969.  Starting from a few 
months of programming by Ken Thompson at his California home, UNIX developed into 
a widely used and respected operating system that has become the ultimate source of 
many of the most successful operating systems in use today.33 
For purposes of this essay, the most important of the open source projects is 
GNU, begun by Richard Stallman in 1984 as an effort to create an operating system that 
would include the benefits of the UNIX operating system but include sufficiently new 
code to avoid the ownership questions that plagued the distribution of UNIX for decades.  
GNU became a viable operating system when Linus Torvalds contributed a working 
kernel to the project in 1994, at which point the software came to be known as 
GNU/Linux (or confusingly, just Linux).  From that point, the Linux operating system 
has evolved through a rapid collaborative process in which a large, worldwide 
community of programmers routinely read, redistribute and modify the source code to 
improve it.  It is subject to the General Public License (GPL), one of the earliest, most 
widely used, and most restrictive of the open source licenses.34 
The rise of large-scale open source development was facilitated by the birth of the 
commercial Internet, which has substantially lowered the costs and logistical complexity 
of transferring information and coordinating programming processes among remote 
individuals.  To that extent, the comparative advantage of the corporate structure as a 
device for organizing sophisticated research has been challenged by the rise of modern 
computer-based techniques of collaboration. 
As the discussion above suggests, open source holds its greatest promise for 
platform products.  For one thing, the market need is greatest for platform products, 
because of the importance of a reliable promise that vendor lock-in will not endanger the 
 
31 The Open Source Initiative is a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by Bruce Perens and Eric 
Raymond.  Generally, it supports a broader conception of open source software, more tolerant of 
commercial interaction, than the Free Software Foundation.  For my purposes, the most important of its 
activities is its promulgation of the Open Source Definition, the generally accepted indicator that a 
particular license should be regarded as “open source.”  For details, visit www.opensource.org. 
32 Campbell-Kelly, supra note 6. 
33 Weber, supra note 3, at 20-53. 
34 Weber, supra note 3, at 54-55, 94-109. 
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survival of products built (or modified) on the software stack above that platform.35 For 
another, it is generally more important in ensuring interoperability to have access to the 
source code of platform products (on which middleware and applications must be 
stacked) than it is of higher-end applications.  For yet another, collaborative development 
has its highest potential in those areas, where firms specializing in different parts of a 
value chain have joint incentives to participate in the development of a high-quality 
product that is broadly accessible.  In that context, open source traditionally has been 
linked to powerful brands, like Linux, Apache, and Perl.  Still, some of the modern open 
source products have moved beyond that niche.  The Firefox web browser, for example, 
is a product gaining recent popularity36 that is not, at least in its current manifestations, 
primarily a platform product.37 
Some of those programs are created almost entirely through the efforts of 
volunteers,38 as in the early days of Linux.  Even now, it probably still is true that most of 
the important projects have roots in self-organizing collaborative activity, even if the 
projects have come to be nurtured and sustained in their maturity by proprietary firms.  
Still, there has been something of a shift toward proprietary involvement in the initiation 
of projects.  Thus, in recent years proprietary companies have tried – albeit with varying 
levels of success – to jump-start projects with a release of formerly proprietary code as 
open source software.  Examples here include Netscape’s release of its browser source 
code in 1998 to form the basis of Mozilla,39 IBM’s 2004 release of Cloudscape to the 
Apache Foundation, and Sun’s recent release of the source code for Solaris 10.  In still 
another model, firms fund the development of new projects through a combination of 
paying employees and sponsoring volunteers to produce products that achieve their goals.  
Leading examples here would be JBoss and MySQL. 
The availability of venture financing – or lack thereof – affects the way in which 
open source firms enter the market.  As discussed in more detail below, it is difficult to 
obtain financing for a product that will be distributed without charge, for which the 
 
35 Vendor lock-in seems to be a particular concern for government procurement.  K.D. Simon, The Value of 
Open Standards and Open-Source Software in Government Environments, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 227 (2005). 
36 After releasing several browsers that did not succeed in the market for various reasons, in November 
2004, the Mozilla Foundation released Firefox (using second-generation Netscape code).  Firefox has been 
an immediate success.  As of August 2005, it is estimated that Firefox has an 8% share of the browser 
market, compared to 87% for IE and 2% for Safari.  Juan Carlos Perez, Firefox Market Share Slips, PC 
WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, available at www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,122213,00.asp.
37 To be sure, the rise of “mash-ups” and similar services suggests at least a possibility that the Firefox 
browser (or some competitor) ultimately will become a major platform for distributed applications.  See 
Elinor Mills, Mapping a Revolution with ‘Mashups’, CNET News.com, Nov. 17, 2005, available at 
http://news.com.com/Mapping+a+revolution+with+mashups/2009-1025_3-5944608.html; Ryan Singel, 
Are You Ready for Web 2.0, WIRED, Oct. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,69114,00.html.
38 Sourceforge.net lists tens of thousands of open source projects.  However, it seems likely that only a few 
of those projects have any significant impact on IT.  See Lerner & Tirole, Scope of Licensing, supra note 3 
(analyzing SourceForge data). 
39 The Mozilla Foundation received startup financing from Netscape in 2003. 
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source code will remain open if the product succeeds, and which (like all software 
products) may never succeed for technical or market-based reasons.  Thus, to the extent it 
has been available at all, venture financing traditionally has appeared after the open 
source product is distributed, modified, and already become a market success.  For 
example, when developers at the University of Cambridge developed Xen (software that 
lets hardware run multiple operating systems) and distributed it openly through two 
versions, they were then able to form a firm, XenSource, with $6 million of venture 
backing.  That financing was used, in turn, to support work on a third version of the 
product, the distribution of professional releases tailored for different environments, and 
product support.  The notable point, though, is that the innovative activity preceded the 
financing.  This contrasts starkly with the financing model for firms pursuing proprietary 
software strategies, where little or no development or deployment is likely to occur 
before first financing.40 
Perhaps the most conceptually difficult aspect of the open source development 
model lies in the way that successful open source projects foster a vibrant and active 
community of contributors.  As many others have recognized, a key part of any such 
project is designing it in a way that will attract talented and motivated individuals to the 
project.41 Generally, the existing literature has focused on how to tap into altruistic 
motivations for individual participants that may be attracted to participation in a 
communitarian endeavor.42 Yet, it is clear that long-time participants in the open-source 
community experience the success of commercial models founded on open-source 
community with distaste, feeling that their work is being co-opted by profit-seeking 
investors and managers.43 The trends discussed in this essay can only exacerbate that 
problem. 
From my perspective, the need to maintain a community that is attractive to 
individuals is not a serious problem with the development model.  It is simply one feature 
that affects the way in which projects are designed.  For example, it is clear from 
interviews that the most perceptive proprietary firms that sponsor open source projects 
will continue to be successful at coordinating their proprietary activities with open source 
communities that will be interested in participating.44 For example, IBM’s recent 
donation of the Cloudscape database was governed by an Apache license, at least in part 
because IBM’s working relationship with that community gave IBM confidence not only 
 
40 Mann & Sager, supra note 1. 
41 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Eric 
S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (1999).   
42 Justin Pappas Johnson, Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good, 11 J. ECONOMICS &
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 637 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, 
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Raymond, supra note 26. 
43 E.g., Bruce Perens, The Emerging Economic Paradigm of Open Source, First Monday, Oct. 3, 2005, 
available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/special10_10/.
44 For a detailed discussion of how to integrate collaborative development into a proprietary firm, see A. 
Neus & P. Scherf, Opening Minds: Cultural Change with the Introduction of Open-Source Collaboration 
Methods, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 215 (2005). 
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that individuals working in that community would have the skills necessary to make the 
program successful.45 It also was important that the relation between that project and 
other Apache-related projects would make the work sufficiently interesting to attract 
those individuals into the development community. 
 2. The Current State of Open Source: Commercialization 
The events of the last few years show that the ties between open source 
communities and large incumbent (proprietary) firms are growing rapidly.  Thus, for 
example, it is plain that a substantial share of the important Linux contributors now has 
gainful employment either directly for OSDL or for one of its major supporters.46 
Indeed, the location of such a high share of the “important” contributors in such posts is 
one of the reasons OSDL executives have been optimistic about their ability to obtain 
consent from enough of those contributors to succeed in reversioning the GPL.47 
Moreover, dual-licensing firms (like MySQL) generally employ directly almost all of 
those that contribute to their projects.  As the interview subjects explain, those firms can 
simply reject any substantial blocks of code submitted by individuals that are not 
interested in employment with the company.  The increasing ties between proprietary 
firms and open source projects illustrate how far the open source development model has 
evolved from the UNIX-hacker days of the 1970s. 
It is harder to get a sense of the relation between open source and small firms.  
Although some of the interviewees suggest that there are a “huge number” of startups 
building on Linux, it is not clear what to make of that perspective.  Using VentureXpert, I 
found only 131 firms (substantially all of which were founded after 1998) whose business 
descriptions contain the terms “Linux,” “Apache” or “open source.”  By any standard, 
that is a small sector of the software startup market.  By comparison, for example, more 
than 200 new software firms received their first financing in 2002 alone.48 Moreover, 
few of those 131 firms are actually profiting directly from open source technology.  For 
example, many simply offer heterogeneous (or cross-platform) operating system support, 
including Linux or Windows,49 or provide proprietary applications that can be used on 
 
45 For similar accounts of IBM efforts at developing open-source communities, see B. Alpern et al., The 
Jikes Research Virtual Machine Project: Building an Open-Source Research Community, 44 IBM 
SYSTEMS J. 399 (2005) (Jalapeno); J. Becking et al., MMBase: An Open-Source Content Management 
System, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J.  381 (2005) (MMBase). 
46 See Daniel Lyons, Peace, Love, and Paychecks, Forbes, Sept. 20, 2004, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0920/180.html/ (discussing corporate sponsorship of key Linux 
contributors). 
47 See also Keith Regan, Browser Rumors Renewed as Google Hires Firefox Programmer, E-Commerce 
Times, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/40015.html (Google hires 
developer responsible for Firefox browser). 
48 For comparison, in 2002 alone more than 200 new firms received more than $850 million in financing. 
49 I would include here firms like Mission Critical Linux. 
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either a Windows or Linux platform,50 or on occasion proprietary applications that can be 
used only on a Linux platform.51 
Some of the most interesting startups are not making open source products, but 
rather are strategically capitalizing on the tension between proprietary and open source 
development models.  Black Duck and Palamida, for example, are two start-up firms that 
make software designed to assist the commingling of open source and proprietary 
technology.  Several firms sell technology designed to link computers of different 
operating systems.52 Open Source Risk Management, for another example, sells legal 
protection against copyright and patent infringement litigation related to open source 
products.53 Finally, some of those firms (like Red Hat, Covalent Technologies, MySQL, 
JBoss, and formerly SCO Group) are distributors of so-called “professional” open source 
products, special proprietary or quasi-proprietary versions of traditional open source 
products. 
That is not to say that it is impossible to have a successful venture-backed startup 
with a purely open-source product.  For example, MontaVista Software has been gaining 
considerable traction in the production of cutting-edge operating systems for embedded 
devices and cell phones.  Currently, it is obtaining license fees for purely open-source 
operating systems, based almost entirely on its ability to promise speed to the market.  
With little copyright or patent protection against duplication of its products, that is a 
difficult route, but it may not be an impossible one. 
Another possibility is to start with open source code as the platform on which to 
build a proprietary product.  Several venture capitalists to whom I have spoken suggest 
that this type of startup is increasingly common.54 The basic expectation here is that the 
startups will build proprietary products around the open-source cores, and that the open-
source nature of the core will make it easier for the startup to integrate its work with the 
core.  As time goes on, it well may be that this will become an increasingly common 
method for the development of proprietary software.  However, that development is still 
at an early stage.  For now at least, an open source foundation is probably still likely to be 
an obstacle to sophisticated venture-backed financing. 
50 Altiris, Atempo, and PERSIST Technologies. 
51 Aduva, Eazel, Eternal Systems, Qlusters, and Scalix. 
52 Cassatt, Centrify, Steeleye Technology, and Vintela. 
53 There are other firms that are not focusing on open risk management per se, but that are capitalizing on 
the lack of interoperability between open source and proprietary operating systems.  CodeWeavers, for 
example, offers a software product that facilitates the use of Windows applications on Linux.  That product 
is a “professional” version of the “free software” Wine Project. 
54 See also Martin LaMonica, Open Source, Open Wallet, CNet, Nov. 7, 2005 (discussing VC investments 
in open-source related startups). 
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3. Software Products Licenses under Open Source Models 
At the center of all of this is the license that governs the use of the code.  Before a 
license can qualify as an open source license, it must have OSI certification.  To become 
certified, the license must meet a set of basic, bare minimum requirements, designed to 
ensure that software is distributed with its source code and that it be reasonably available 
without constraint to developers and users that wish to use it or modify it for their own 
purposes.55 Again, those requirements are not logically necessary to solve the 
interoperability and transparency problems discussed above.  A proprietary developer 
could arguably achieve the same ends with an aggressive program of sharing source code 
with developers and major customers.  Indeed, Microsoft’s shared source program is 
designed to address that problem.56 Yet the absence of any response to those issues 
throughout the 1990’s played a major role in the rise of open source.  Moreover, a shared 
source program cannot solve the concerns about vendor lock-in that motivate many 
enterprises to choose open rather than proprietary platforms. 
Thus, the open source communities’ awareness of those issues has led to their 
establishment of a baseline expectation, embodied in the OSI requirements, that must 
now be met before any project can take advantage of the formal and informal 
infrastructure that has arisen to support open source development.  Beyond those basic 
requirements, however, the licenses differ in a number of ways that are important for 
understanding their effect on commercial development of the licensed software.57 For the 
present discussion, the licenses differ most importantly in three ways: (a) the constraints 
on incorporation of the licensed code in later products; (b) the rules about the 
 
55 As set forth at www.opensource.org, Version 1.9 of the Open Source Definition includes the following 
requirements: free redistribution must be tolerated; inclusion of source code; the creation and distribution 
of derivative works must be tolerated; the license cannot discriminate against particular users or fields of 
endeavor; rights under the license must extend to all users whether or not they have executed a formal 
license; the license cannot be restricted to use of the program as part of a specific product; the license 
cannot restrict other software solely because it is distributed with the licensed software; and the license 
must be technology-neutral.   
56 See http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/default.mspx.
57 An interesting problem that warrants further inquiry is why open source licenses continue to proliferate.  
See Rosen, supra note 3, at 235-38.  It would make more sense for a relatively small number of standard 
forms to begin to dominate, but it continues to be the case that new projects often result in newly developed 
licenses, like the new Community Development and Distribution License Sun devised for its Solaris 
contribution.  Historically, the classic licenses like the GPL, LGPL, BSD, and MIT licenses dominated 
significant projects until the late 1990’s, but starting with the release of Mozilla in 1998 the number of 
licenses approved by OSI has increased rapidly.  As I write, 58 separate licenses have been approved.  This 
problem has gained increasing attention in recent years, largely because of the increasing difficulty of 
combining software code written within different licensing domains.  The underlying fear is not so much 
that a particular project (like Linux) will split into separate projects, or fork, as it is that the open source 
community as a whole will become a number of effectively separate gated communities.  Rosen, supra note 
3, at 247-53. 
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contribution of IP rights related to contributed code; and (c) the rules about enforcement 
of IP rights by users of the software.58 
The first has traditionally been the major point of differentiation among open 
source licenses.  Here, there is a readily discernible continuum, from fully “reciprocal” 
licenses (like the GPL) at the one end to “academic” licenses (like the BSD) at the other.  
The oft-debated § 2(b) of the GPL, for example, provides that its restrictions must apply 
not only to the original GPL code but also to any “modified work” that includes GPL 
code unless “identifiable sections” of the modified work “can be reasonably considered 
independent and separate works in themselves.”  Thus, the license reflects a concept of 
reciprocal obligation.  If a developer wants to take advantage of the contributions 
reflected in an existing piece of GPL code, the developer is free to do so, provided that 
the developer makes a reciprocal contribution of the developer’s modifications into the 
GPL model.59 The scope of restrictions imposed by that provision is debatable,60 but it 
certainly imposes at least some constraint on the ability of a developer to incorporate 
GPL code into a fully proprietary product.61 
At the other end of the spectrum, the so-called “academic” licenses like the BSD 
license impose no similar constraints on distribution, requiring only that distributors 
include the code and give appropriate credit.  The concept of those licenses is that work 
prepared solely for academic purposes should be freely available to the entire community 
to use as it sees fit with no strings attached.62 Thus, for example, Microsoft easily can 
(and does) include some BSD code in its operating system.  Other major licenses have an 
effect similar to the BSD license, though they state it more explicitly.  The Mozilla Public 
License (MPL), for example, states in § 3.7: 
 
58 This section draws heavily on the terminology and analysis of Rosen, supra note 3. 
59 I do not address here the question whether the licenses are binding as a matter of contract or through 
rules of property rights.  On that point, Peggy Radin has suggested that the property rights argument is 
quite weak.  The absence of robust mechanisms for execution similarly undermines the idea that they 
operate by creating contractual obligations.  Of course, because the right to use the software is likely to 
depend on the existence of a license, the absence of any contractual obligation will be important only in 
cases when stopping subsequent use is not an adequate remedy.  The main example of this is likely to be in 
the enforcement of provisions that purport to govern enforcement of patent rights by users of the software. 
60 For contrasting evaluations, compare, e.g., James V. Delong, The Enigma of Open Source Software 
(Version 1.0) (unpublished 2004 manuscript) (a highly expansive interpretation) with Rosen, supra note 3 
(a much narrower interpretation). 
61 Typical reciprocity provisions apply only when the work is “distributed.”  GPL § 2(b).  With the rise of 
application service providers, that leaves a loophole that would permit commercial exploitation of a 
derivative work without distribution.  Accordingly, newer licenses extend the reciprocity provision to 
include any “external deployment” of the derivative work that makes the work available to users over a 
computer network.  See, e.g., Apple Public Source License § 2.2; Real Networks Public Source License § 
1.7; Open Software License § 5.  See also Rosen, supra note 3, at 193-95. 
62 The concept behind that license resonates strongly with the academic community of motivation and 
intellectual contribution, as discussed in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and 
Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1988). 
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You may create a Larger Work by combining Covered Code with 
other code not governed by the terms of this License and distribute 
the Larger Work as a single product.  In such a case, You must 
make sure the requirements of this License are fulfilled for the 
Covered Code. 
{Sun’s new Common Development and Distribution License (the CDDL), which governs 
its contribution of Solaris, includes a substantially identical provision (§ 3.6).}  Similarly, 
the Apache License (Version 2.0) provides in § 4: “You may reproduce and distribute 
copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without 
modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You [give recipients a copy of 
the license, include “prominent notices” of your changes, and include appropriate 
attribution notices].” 
 The second crucial point of differentiation among the licenses is the coverage of 
intellectual property rights held by those that contribute to the project.  The traditional 
practice has been to rely on the understanding that any party that contributed to an open 
source project would grant an implied license that permitted ordinary uses of the resulting 
software.  Licenses like the GPL63 and the BSD that do not explicitly deal with the 
problem must rely on that concept.64 Recent licenses deal with the subject more directly, 
including specific copyright and patent licenses from all contributors to all users.65 
Indeed, the Apache Software Foundation has developed a separate Apache Contributor 
License Agreement designed specifically to respond to this problem.66 
For this discussion, what is most interesting about those licenses is the care with 
which they limit the patent rights that the contributor grants.  For example, § 2.1 of the 
Mozilla Public License carefully limits the patent grant of the initial developer (Netscape) 
to cover only patents that are necessary to the use of the Original Code.67 Thus, if 
Netscape had at the time it contributed the Original Code a patent that was not infringed 
by the Original Code, but was infringed by a new module added to that code at a later 
time, nothing in the MPL would require Netscape to license that patent to subsequent 
users of the code.68 A slightly different twist comes from IBM’s Common Public 
 
63 GPL § 7 does include an odd provision barring redistribution by any party that is prevented by a patent 
license from tolerating royalty-free distribution.  Although that strongly suggests what is obviously 
expected, it does not rise to the level of an express grant of IP rights by contributors. 
64 As Rosen explains, there are numerous technical problems in relying on implied licenses, such as the 
question whether the license extends to patents that have not yet been issued at the time of the contribution 
or to later versions of the open-source project that do not exist at the time of the contribution.  Rosen, supra 
note 3, at 79, 126-127. 
65 See e.g., Apache License §§ 2, 3; CDDL §§ 2.1, 2.2. 
66 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 93-94. 
67 It appears that the desire to delimit this grant so carefully was one of the main reasons for the 
development of the MPL in preference to the then-existing reciprocal license forms.  Rosen, supra note 3, 
at 147-150. 
68 Rosen, supra note 3, at 148-150. 
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License, which excludes from the patent grant a license to any patent not issued at the 
time of the contribution, even if an application already was on file.69 
The final point of differentiation is how the licenses deal with the risk of 
allegations of patent infringement.  On this point, proprietary licenses often indemnify 
users against patent infringement claims filed by third parties.  That is not, however, 
practical in the open source context.  There, the “licensor” of any particular program 
often is a distributed body of difficult-to-identify contributors.70 Thus, open source 
licenses generally impose the infringement risk on licensees.71 The response to the 
problem thus is limited to creating incentives of various degrees designed to deter users 
of the program from instituting patent litigation by the threat of withdrawing further 
rights to use the open source program.72 It is difficult to weigh the effect of those 
provisions.  For successful programs that become “mission-critical,” it is easy to see that 
they would have a powerful effect.  For less important programs that a user easily could 
abandon, the provisions would be less effective. 
For present purposes, what is most interesting is the great variation in the 
provisions focusing on third party IP, primarily because it suggests more of a conscious 
attention to the importance of protecting patent rights than one would expect given the 
mythology of a patent-free open source movement.  For example, § 8 of the MPL 
provides that a suit claiming that a contributor’s version of the software violates a patent 
will result in a termination of the plaintiff’s rights to use that version of the software.  
Furthermore, a suit against any contributor to an MPL project for any other form of 
patent infringement will lead to a termination of the right to use any contribution of that 
participant to any MPL product.73 Perhaps the broadest provision appears in § 12.1(c) of 
the Apple Public Source License, which terminates “if You * * * commence an action for 
patent infringement against Apple; provided that Apple did not first commence an action 
for patent infringement against You.” 
Those provisions have a fascinating effect, because they generally operate not 
only to protect the products in question, but as I discuss in more detail below, slowly to 
bring open source products within the cross-licensing equilibrium that has provided 
stability to the proprietary wing of the industry for some time.  At the same time, those 
provisions often seem unpalatable to companies with large patent portfolios, because they 
require them to forgo claims under that portfolio for products unrelated to the open 
 
69 CPL § 2; see Rosen, supra note 3, at 163-166. 
70 That is particularly true for programs governed by licenses like the GPL that do not directly provide for 
sublicensing, but rather contemplate licenses directly from each contributor to each user. 
71 The closest thing to a warranty of noninfringement is the warranty of “provenance” that appears in many 
of the modern open source licenses, in which the contributor states it “believes” that its contributions are its 
original creations and noninfringing.  MPL § 3.4(c); see Rosen, supra note 3, at 158, 198-201. 
72 See e.g., Apache § 3; MPL § 8.2.  As a related matter, licenses also often require contributors to include 
notice of patent problems of which they might be aware.  MPL § 3.4. 
73 Rosen, supra note 3, at 154-56.   
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source project in which they are participating.  This has spurred the drafting of weaker 
patent defense provisions, such as the one in the current version of § 10 of the Open 
Software License and the Academic Free License, which terminates a license for the 
contributed work only for a claim against the contributed work.74 By excluding 
termination based on the exercise of patent rights against unrelated software, it is thought, 
the provision makes participation in and use of open source projects more palatable for 
firms with large patent portfolios.75 
III. Motivations for the Commercialization of Open Source 
A.  Open Source as a Viable Business Model 
As Section 2 suggests, open source development is aptly viewed as a direct 
challenge to the traditional “one-shop” model of proprietary software development.  The 
natural question, then, how to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two 
business models?   
The important differences are easily summarized.  In the proprietary model, the 
coordination and direction of research and development are accomplished within the 
boundaries of a single firm, directed and funded by the management of that firm.  The 
advantages of the model are that of bringing any complex activity within the boundaries 
of a single firm: the ability of the firm to collect resources from investors and then decide 
at a central point how best to allocate those resources to maximize the effectiveness of 
any particular development project.  The ability to make rapid responses to new and 
surprising events, for example, is a strong advantage of the proprietary model. 
In the open source model, by contrast, the level of central control is much lower, 
with development proceeding through relatively decentralized hierarchies.76 The strength 
of open source development is its potential to produce products with a higher quality and 
more innovative character than parallel proprietary products.  Although discourse from 
supporters often reflects a deep-seated, at times almost mystical, conviction that 
collaborative development is superior to centrally directed development, the argument in 
fact resonates strongly with the recent literature on open innovation.77 In that context, 
advocates have focused on the ability of a collaborative and decentralized development 
process to produce better solutions more rapidly than a process centralized within a single 
firm or laboratory.  There is also a distinctly populist reveling in the idea that 
unsupported individuals can produce software of a commercial quality that can compete 
 
74 See also Apache License § 3 (similar provision).   
75 Rosen, supra note 3, at 217-18. 
76 This is not to say that there is not organization.  As Weber, supra note 3, explains in detail, there is a 
great deal of organization of open source development.  My point, however, is that control and allocation of 
resources is decentralized: Linus Torvalds has much less ability than Microsoft’s Chief Software Architect 
to control precisely what Linux projects are handled with what level of urgency and resources. 
77 HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND 
PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (2003). 
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with the output of the world’s largest corporations.78 It is, to be sure, difficult to obtain 
empirical evidence about quality, and the existing evidence seems ambiguous.79 The 
widespread adoption of the commercially successful open-source products, however, 
offers strong testimony that in some contexts at least the collaborative development 
model can produce software of high quality and easy interoperability. 
Aside from the quality of the software product, there remains the key inquiry of 
how it can make sense for profit-seeking firms to invest in open source projects if they 
categorically will be prohibited from obtaining a return on their investment through 
control of the resulting software.  In the proprietary model, property rights make it 
possible for a firm to internalize the benefits of R&D by excluding third parties from 
exploiting the results of the research: it is not necessarily easy to make a profit, but it is 
relatively easy to obtain revenues. 
However, the direct importance of property rights to the proprietary software 
industry can be overstated.  Many firms do not directly exploit their patents, and 
relatively few exploit their patents to collect licensing revenues.80 One industry 
executive illustrated that point effectively when he explained that in large patent-
sophisticated firms in the software industry there is a split of about 15/85 between patents 
that are licensed for revenues and those that are used defensively to maintain freedom of 
action.  The analogous ratio in the pharmaceutical industry, he suggested was about 
75/25.  To the extent that firms do collect licensing revenues,81 those revenues directly 
support the R&D that helps the firm to maintain the quality and competitiveness of its 
technology.  Still, the ability to prevent third parties from copying software products (if 
only through copyright protection) is much more robust in a model with property rights 
than it is in an open source model, in which the standard OSI requirements – even in the 
most lenient of licenses – make it impractical to exclude third parties from exploitation of 
technology created in an open source community.  Thus, the open source investor 
searching for a return must do something other than sell software to customers that wish 
to use it. 
 
78 A. Boulanger, Open-Source Versus Proprietary Software: Is One More Reliable and Secure Than the 
Other, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 239 (2005), provides an interesting (though inconclusive) study of vulnerability 
and defect rates in open-source and proprietary software. 
79 Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 265 (2004).  On the one hand, open source proponents can point, among other things, to the low cost 
of their products (often available for free).  At the same time, advocates of proprietary software can point to 
studies suggesting that the total cost of ownership, including training and maintenance charges, is higher 
for open source software.  As the text suggests, my impression is that the studies as a group are ambiguous, 
suggesting that one type of software or the other might be cheaper and more effective in one context or 
another, but that broad general claims of superiority are difficult to sustain. 
80 Mann, supra note 1. 
81 As discussed in Mann, supra note 1, IBM collects literally billions of dollars each year from the licensing 
of software-related patents.  Other incumbent firms, however, have been less successful in generating large 
revenue streams from those patents.  For example, although Microsoft has begun a similar program (also 
discussed in Mann, supra note 1), it remains to be seen whether it will generate revenues that are 
sufficiently large to play an important role on Microsoft’s income statement. 
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1. Predatory Motive: the “Kill Microsoft” Approach 
In the discussion of possible business models for open source investors, one of the 
most prominent ideas (suggested, for example, by Rob Merges) is that the model itself 
cannot be made profitable, but that firms invest in it solely because it decreases the 
monopoly power of Microsoft.82 In its simplest form, the idea is that firms are willing to 
make current expenditures that do not generate a monetary return under current 
conditions, solely because of the likelihood that they will lessen the ability of Microsoft 
to extract future monopoly profits in markets in which those firms might eventually 
participate.  To spin it slightly differently, a large customer (like Intel) might like to 
preserve a competitor to Microsoft simply to minimize the risks of being locked in to a 
single vendor. 
Alternatively, perhaps the expectation is that profits will come from market power 
in some new market that develops in a more open and competitive way than it would if 
Microsoft were more powerful.  For example, if IBM thinks that it can respond to change 
and innovation more rapidly than competitors like Microsoft and Sun, then IBM should 
expect to profit from any development that causes more rapid innovative shifts in the 
industry. 
This explanation is of great concern to Microsoft, where many executives plainly 
believe that it has some element of truth.  However, several software executives to whom 
I have spoken have emphasized that the most obvious victims of IBM’s Linux strategy, to 
the extent there have been victims, are UNIX competitors like Sun Microsystems, not 
Microsoft.  Sun at one time was a direct competitor with IBM in the market for servers 
and the software that runs them.  The rise of Linux has destabilized Sun’s market position 
as a top-line purveyor of servers and of a state-of-the-art flavor of UNIX (Solaris).83 
Thus, predatory-motive theory seems at best an incomplete story. 
 2. Traditional Profit Motive: the Value Chain Approach 
Although there surely is some truth to it, the “kill Microsoft” explanation 
understates the extent to which investments in open-source projects are directly profitable 
– without regard to their effect on Microsoft.  Before suggesting that the investments are 
irrational, it is important to understand how substantial they really are.  Executives have 
estimated that the amount that proprietary companies currently spend on the development 
of Linux is at least $1 billion a year, much of that coming from a small group of seven 
large proprietary companies that are major investors in the Open Source Development 
 
82 Merges, supra note 3. 
83 The competition between IBM and Sun is to some degree bound up in their differing open source 
strategies.  IBM of course was one of the earliest of the major proprietary companies to develop a strong 
open source strategy.  Sun’s interactions with the movement have been much less harmonious, both 
because of its decision not to open source Java and because of its willingness to reach a cross-licensing 
agreement with Microsoft that did not protect Open Office.  It remains to be seen whether its decision to 
open source Solaris in early 2004 will be successful.  See also Raymond, supra note 26 (arguing that Sun’s 
license structures have alienated open-source communities). 
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Laboratory: IBM, HP, Intel, Fujitsu, Red Hat, Novell, and General Motors (collectively 
the OSDL group).84 
The most logical explanation for those investments comes from the typical 
business-school concept of the value chain.  The idea is that a successful IT installation 
necessarily will involve a variety of components, which can be characterized collectively 
as a value chain (or a software stack).  Different companies will have core competencies 
in different aspects of that chain.  One classic strategy is for any company to foster the 
commoditization of those portions of the stack in which the company does not have a 
core competency, so that it can earn high(er) returns for those portions of the stack in 
which it can defeat its competitors. 
To use the simplest example, Microsoft and Intel can be seen as developing one 
successful value chain that involves the sale of highly profitable products paired with the 
successful commoditization of the personal computer that uses those products.  The point 
is currently easy to see, as the sale of IBM’s personal computer division to Lenovo marks 
the departure of the firm that invented the market, and the increasing domination of a 
firm the core competency of which is logistics (Dell). 
The only departure from the well-recognized strategy described above is to use 
non-proprietary – “free” – products as part of the value chain instead of commoditized 
products from other proprietary companies.  Conceptually, it is no different from a 
developer dedicating public streets in a subdivision if that is the way to maximize the 
total value of the package.85 Just as all homeowners in an area can benefit by sharing a 
single public street that runs near all of their homes, the OSDL group benefits by sharing 
the costs of production of the Linux operating system.  For example, one group of 
executives suggested that maintaining a competitive enterprise software platform 
currently requires about $500 million of investment each year.  If IBM can spend $100 
 
84 This surely understates the total amount of investment.  As I have mentioned above, there is some 
difficult-to-quantify amount of venture-backed investment.  There also is a considerable amount of 
informal investment from proprietary companies that tolerate code writing by their employees or sponsor 
important open source participants as employees (as when Torvalds worked for some time at Transmeta).  
MARTIN FINK, THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS OF LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE (2003).  It also is common for 
proprietary companies to spin off companies devoted wholly to open source.  It is not yet clear, however, 
how those activities relate to the venture investment activities of major firms.  As Benson & Ziedonis show, 
the investment models for those investments are quite difficult to understand.  David Benson & Rosemarie 
Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Corporate Venture Capital and the Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Firms 
(unpublished 2004 Univ. of Mich. working paper).  In this context, I expect that the most difficult to 
quantify effect is the likelihood that a firm would support an open-source startup that itself might never be 
profitable if the startup’s activities would increase demand for hardware, services, or infrastructure 
products sold by the sponsor.  This surely explains, for example, why Intel Capital is the most prolific 
investor in the open source-related startups I discuss above.  It invested in 14 of the 66 United States firms 
in the “Computer Software” sector. 
85 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857 
(2003) (exploring why an innovator might gain more profit from an innovation if it could foster related 
innovations through a gift to the public domain of some portion of the innovation).   
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million per year on Linux and obtain access to such a platform, that is much cheaper than 
maintaining the platform on its own.86 
Thus, the individual members of the OSDL group can rationalize their 
investments in Linux not solely because it might harm Microsoft, and not because of any 
profits on sales of Linux, but because the development of Linux as a high-quality 
operating system permits each of them to develop complementary goods and services in 
their respective core competencies.87 From this perspective, Linux is not very different 
from any other vendor providing a software product that can be loaded onto products 
developed by the firm that contributes to Linux.  For those firms, this value chain works 
better for those companies than the competing Wintel value chain because it is a value 
chain in which the operating system will not be used to extract profits.  Indeed, open 
source software is optimally suited for this type of arrangement because it is the ultimate 
commodity: anybody can sell it for free, which makes it quite difficult for a firm to 
develop a competitive position that allows it to extract profits that would undermine the 
OSDL strategy.  For now at least, this makes cooperation easier because the individual 
firms more rationally can defer fears that the enterprise will tip in favor of one party’s 
technology that will run the table and drive competitors from the market (as happens so 
often in proprietary software products markets). 
Moreover, when IBM and other members of the OSDL group began making large 
investments in Linux, Linux already was beginning to make inroads in the server 
market.88 If those companies had resolutely stayed outside that field, they risked a 
disruption in the market – a shift from high-priced servers and proprietary operating 
systems to commoditized servers with free operating systems that could have driven them 
from it completely, something that seems about to happen to Sun despite its efforts to 
participate in the open source community.  The textbook response to that situation is to 
attempt to co-opt the potentially disruptive technology into the business model of the 
existing firm.89 The result has not been to stop the disruption.  Rather, as suggested 
above, it has been to focus the disruption on the firms least capable of integrating the new 
technology into their business models (Sun, if this analysis turns out to be correct).90 
Thus, investment in open source has for those companies (Intel and IBM being potential 
beneficiaries of Sun’s difficulties) been successful as a disruptive strategy. 
 
86 See Raymond, supra note 26 (discussing the benefits of cost-spreading). 
87 Mahony & Naughton, supra note 4; Perens, supra note 43. 
88 For an official IBM account, see P.G. Capek et al., A History of IBM’s Open-Source Involvement and 
Strategy, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 249 (2005). 
89 Clayton M. Christensen, Jr., The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail (1997).  Industry executives emphasized that the rise of Linux does not fit the Christensen model 
perfectly, largely because Linux entered the market from the top – as a high-quality flexible product, 
moving from the most demanding users to the least demanding, rather than from the bottom, moving from 
the least demanding users to the most demanding. 
90 The success of this strategy is particularly noteworthy given the general perception among my interview 
subjects that Sun’s software technology – the Solaris operating system – is the most sophisticated of the 
Unix-based operating systems. 
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Therefore, to use an obvious example, IBM is perhaps the most multi-faceted firm 
in the IT industry.  If IBM cannot profit from sales of the Linux operating system and the 
Apache web server program, there are plenty of ways that it can profit in a value chain 
that uses those programs.  For one thing, it can sell the servers that use those programs.  
Although IBM has come far from the days when the sale of computer hardware was its 
only business, it continues to have major hardware lines in the areas where Linux is most 
commonly used.  At the next level, IBM can write proprietary software that can be used 
on those computers.  For example, after IBM failed to write its own successful 
proprietary web-server program, it surrendered to the dominant Apache program.  Having 
done so, it was able to develop its highly successful WebSphere program, which is 
designed specifically to run on computers that use Apache.  One of the key pieces of that 
strategy was the ability of IBM to gain market adoption by marketing a program designed 
for the large community of firms using Apache, something it was unable to do in earlier 
years when it had tried to bundle similar products with its own proprietary server 
programs.  Finally, and perhaps most profitably, IBM is probably the industry leader at 
selling the services that are necessary to make the various hardware and software 
products fit together.91 
Apple’s recent deployment of OS X is another exemplary application of the 
value-chain approach.  There, Apple has deployed a commoditized base of software 
drawn from the OpenBSD flavor of UNIX, but placed on top of it the sophisticated look 
and feel of a top-quality graphical user interface – focusing proprietary efforts on Apple’s 
core competency. 
B.  Open Source as a Market Correction   
The most thoughtful assessment of the role of IP in this context is Rob Merges’s 
paper on A New Dynamism,92 which generally portrays open source as a market 
correction responding to excessive protection of IP.  He views the investments that 
proprietary firms make in open source projects as “property preempting investments” 
(PPI)—or a form of “anti-property”—designed to protect the commons from enclosure 
by IP rights held by incumbents (of whom Microsoft is his principal concern).  Although 
 
91 My analysis is not undermined by the examples in Peter Swire’s cogent working paper on the security 
market, Security Market: Incentives to Disclose for Security and Competitive Reasons (Oct. 11, 2005) 
(draft §§ II(B)(3) – (4), discussing this manuscript).  Swire suggests that his interviews indicate that 
proprietary firms are profiting directly from investments in open-source related areas and that my “value-
chain” analysis suggests an undue level of indirectness and complication is necessary for proprietary firms 
to profit in this area.  Studying his examples, however, I have the impression that the disagreement is 
largely semantic.  His principal examples – firms that use proprietary code adjoined to open-source code or 
firms that sell services tailored to open-source code – strike me as precisely the type of business models 
that I discuss here. 
92 Merges, supra note 3. 
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that perspective brings a healthy dose of economic analysis to a subject that is often 
unduly romanticized,93 I believe that his perspective also is incomplete. 
Merges argues that the balance between too many and too few property rights can 
or will be solved essentially by making PPIs or creation of “anti-property” rights.94 
Generally, he suggests that the investments are designed to make (in my words) an 
“exclosure” – the opposite of an enclosure – as a “property-free zone”95 into which later 
actors cannot force their proprietary claims.  That is not, however, a complete answer.  
To be sure, developers do write lines of code and contribute them to a community under 
licenses that grant broad use rights to subsequent licensee users.  For several reasons, 
however, that does not have nearly so bucolic an effect as the casual reader of Merges’ 
paper might assume. 
The first reason is the simplest one: contributors to open source projects for the 
most part96 do not convey their IP rights wholesale to the open source community – they 
only license them.  Therefore, in the case of Linux, there are literally hundreds of 
contributors that own copyright interests in their contributed code and thereby retain the 
ability to hinder reversioning of the GPL through exercise of their retained copyright 
interests.97 The possibility of conflict is not simply a matter of “FUD”98: the analogous 
reversioning problem for the MPL is at least partially responsible for the birth of Firefox 
as a substantially new program free from the strictures of the original MPL. 
 
93 See Anupam Chandler & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 
(2004), for a similarly anti-romantic account. 
94 Merges, supra note 3. 
95 I do not want to press the point too far, but the rhetoric of a commons also is inconsistent with the 
reliance on trademarks, which are critically important to the open source model.  See Rosen, supra note 3, 
at 231-32; see also Ingrid Marson, Torvalds Weighs in on Linux Trademark Row, CNet, Aug. 22, 2005 
(discussing Linus Torvalds’s defense of vigorous action taken on his behalf to enforce the Linux 
tradename); Ingrid Marson, JBoss Denies Running a Trademark Monopoly, CNet, Oct. 11, 2005 
(discussing responses by Marc Fleury to critics of JBoss’s trademark enforcement policies).  Trademarks 
have some of the same attributes as other forms of intangible property, such as the creation of network or 
bandwagon effects.  Therefore, even if open source did not depend on patent or copyright protections – a 
point that I debate in the text – it is still hard to say that property rights are not important in open source. 
96 Although that problem does apply to large portions of the Linux code (apparently because of the 
expressed wishes of Linus Torvalds), it is by no means universal.  Many contributors in fact do convey 
their rights to entities like the Free Software Foundation or the Apache Foundation, which for my purposes 
would seem to be a trustee of the “exclosed” commons. 
97 For discussion of the reversioning effort, go to www.gplv3.fsf.org (login required). 
98 According to wikipedia, FUD “is a sales or marketing strategy of disseminating negative but vague or 
inaccurate information on a competitor's product. The term originated to describe misinformation tactics in 
the computer software industry and has since been used more broadly.  * * * * FUD was first defined by 
Gene Amdahl after he left IBM to found his own company, Amdahl Corp.: ‘FUD is the fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt that IBM sales people instill in the minds of potential customers who might be considering 
Amdahl products.’”  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FUD
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In the event of disagreement over the direction a project should take, ultimately 
the dispute will be resolved in favor of the person that controls the relevant IP (whether 
that is copyrights in the source code, control of the trade name, or ownership of important 
patents).99 Similarly, reversioning of the GPL would be much easier if everyone in the 
community could be sure that all of the hundreds of Linux contributors blithely would 
agree to anything that the organizers of the Free Software Foundation and OSDL submit 
as an appropriate update of the GPL.100 But in the end, if there is a dispute over either of 
those issues, the person with control of the IP will have the final word: it is Torvalds’ 
control of much of the core IP in Linux that gives him so much negotiating power in the 
struggle to update the GPL. 
For still another variation, consider the case of dual-licensing firms like MySQL, 
where substantially all of the IP rights are localized in the hands of a firm that directly 
employs contributors to the project, which allows the firm to use a conventional 
proprietary licensing model to exploit a version of the software that might not differ 
substantially from the version available under an open-source license. 
The second reason why an “exclosure” may not create a fully property-free zone 
relates to the terms of the open source projects’ licenses.  As discussed above, it is quite 
plain, particularly in the area of the modern commercial licenses (the MPL, the CPL, the 
Apple and Sun licenses, etc.),101 that licenses are consciously being drafted with 
considerable technical care to limit the nature of the patent rights a contributor licenses to 
an open source community.  As discussed above, the modern licenses generally do not
offer a broad grant of all IP rights necessary to permit development of the project to 
which the contribution has been made.  Rather, they are limited to existing patents, or to 
patents that apply to the project in its current stage, or the like. 
The third reason is a simple matter of patent doctrine.  Even in situations in which 
contributors have used licenses or contribution agreements that operate to transfer all of 
their IP interests, they cannot logically create a property-free “exclosure,” because of the 
possibility that the resulting software product will infringe patent rights held by 
noncontributors.  To be sure, open-source contributions might amount to a sufficiently 
public use of the code to constitute prior art, and thus would prevent others from 
obtaining subsequent patent rights that prevented use of the code by the open source 
community.  They would not, however, prevent the assertion of patent rights by persons 
 
99 See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Mambo Project Faces Rift, CNet, Aug. 22, 2005 (discussing 
dispute among contributors to Mambo). 
100 As I revise this manuscript, the possibility of conflict has become more serious, as Linus Torvalds has 
announced his dissatisfaction with the early drafts of GPLv3.0.  See Richard Stallman’s Radical Approach 
to Software Patents, SCI-TECH TODAY, Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.sci-tech-
today.com/news/Stallman-s-Radical-Approach-to-Software/story.xhtml?story_id=0200028E0GNC.
101 Because the GPL includes no explicit patent license from its contributors, it is harder to be precise in 
making this point about the GPL.  I take it as plain, however, that the implied license conveyed by a GPL 
contribution would be similarly incomplete.  See Rosen, supra note 3. 
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who had made similar undisclosed inventions before the creation of the open source prior 
art. 
Perhaps the most effective way – albeit an imperfect and costly one – to ensure a 
zone free of third-party property rights is for the software developer to create its own 
patent rights to cover the space.  For example, Sun claims102 that it owns all of the patents 
necessary for the deployment of Solaris.  Early and aggressive patenting can make it 
difficult for independent designers to obtain patent rights that write on to the covered 
product, though even there the possibility of surprise bombshell patents is a real one in an 
industry with such a high pace of innovation, where foundational patents easily could 
issue in 2005 for primeval technology first invented in the distant past of 2001.  Thus, 
many if not all of the large firms in this area continue to collect patents.  Although several 
of those firms have made statements about their plans to enforce or not enforce certain 
patents against certain potential infringers, none of those firms has made an enforceable 
commitment to forego their enforcement rights entirely.  To the contrary, those patent 
rights are maintained as part of the elaborate equilibrium of cross-licensing arrangements 
that I describe above. 
To be sure, the early days of 2005 witnessed some notable pledges not to enforce 
patents by IBM,103 Sun, and Nokia.  Those statements, however, did not extend to 
contributing the patents to a commons, much less to a property-free public domain.  
Thus, for example, IBM’s pledge was made to developers of open source products and 
not the public at large.104 The underlying technology is not, for example, available for 
the development of proprietary offerings by competing products or services firms (such 
as Microsoft or Apple, both of which have used UNIX technology in their operating 
systems).  Nor is the grant absolute, because it is not effective against a firm that asserts 
patent claims against IBM.  Similarly, Sun’s pledge is limited to patents used in 
Solaris,105 so it does little more than the implied (or express) grant of patent rights that 
 
102 This claim seems most implausible, although it has been made quite publicly. 
103 In the case of IBM, the contribution followed a statement that IBM does not intend to assert its patent 
portfolio against the Linux kernel, unless it is forced to defend itself.  That statement is broader, in the 
sense that it covered the entire portfolio, but it is much less formal, and thus much less likely to create 
reliably enforceable obligations on the part of IBM as circumstances change in the ever-developing 
landscape of the industry. 
104 IBM’s pledge applies “to any individual, community, or company working on or using software that 
meets the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition of open source software now or in the future.”  The 
patents (a list of which is available on IBM’s web site) cover a broad range of technologies.  However, 
some have criticized the scope of the pledge because many of the patents are thought to be of little use to 
the open source community.  A cursory review of the list reveals that 397 of the 500 patents are in primary 
IPC G06F (the code typically associated with software).  Some of the patents are quite dated:  199 were 
issued in 2001; 232 were issued in 1997; and 69 were issued in 1993. 
105 Sun’s pledge purports to give free access to patents “under the Common Development and Distribution 
License (CDDL).” 
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would be included in a license to use Solaris.106 To be sure, responding to a barrage of 
criticism of the limited significance of that pledge, Sun has announced that despite the 
absence of a “fancy pledge” on its website, it has “no intention of suing open source 
developers.”107 Still, it is not at all clear that Sun has committed that it will not use its 
patent portfolio to challenge Linux as a competitor to Solaris.  To the extent Sun’s 
program rests on the desire to create a Solaris-based value chain that would facilitate the 
sale of hardware, an attack to destabilize the Linux-based value chain might be a 
plausible response.  The narrowness of the pledges is made clearest by the praise Nokia 
garnered for the modest step of extending its pledge not only to the existing versions of 
Linux but also to future ones.108 
I do not mean to understate the commitment of those firms to the development of 
collaborative research in those areas.  My point is a more fundamental one: that it is not 
constructive to think of these investments as creating a truly open domain, or in Merges’s 
terms, a “property preempting investment.” 
Having said that, there can be little doubt that open source strategies are deterring 
others from enforcing their patent rights in some contexts.  It works just like the creation 
of large patent portfolios within individual firms, but is potentially even more powerful.  
Essentially, using combined patent portfolios to create fences around (at least) some open 
source technologies, the large firms are just shifting the equilibrium slightly.  In 
substance, they are sending a clear message: 
We mean to protect these technologies as much as – if not 
more than – we protect our own proprietary products.  Although we 
may not use our patent rights offensively, we will use them to 
defend our proprietary products and the open source technologies 
that we support.109 
106 See CDDL § 2.1(b).  As discussed above, express or implied provisions to that effect are ubiquitous in 
modern open-source licenses. 
107 Stephen Shankland, Sun: Patent Use OK Beyond Solaris Project, Jan. 31, 2005, available at 
http://news.com.com/Sun+Patent+use+OK+beyond+Solaris+project/2100-7344_3-
5557658.html?tag=sas.email
108 Jim Wagner, Nokia’s Linux Pledge, Developer, May 26, 2005, available at 
http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3508146. For an additional anecdote about Computer 
Associates, compare the laudatory press release discussing Computer Associates’ pledge, Chris 
Preimesberger, CA Patents Made Available to Open-Source Community, eWeek.com, Sept. 7, 2005, with 
later criticism of the pledge as ineffectual, Matt Whipp, Computer Associates’ Patent Donation Is 
Slammed, PC Pro, Sept. 13, 2005 (reporting complaints about the CA pledge on the grounds that the 
covered patents had little value). 
109 As I complete this article, several of the major Linux backers have formalized this strategy with the 
formation of the Open Invention Network.  Press reports suggest this entity will provide royalty-free 
licenses to parties that agree not to assert patent rights against Linux users that have signed similar 
agreements.  Linux Backers Form Patent-Sharing Firm, CNet, Nov. 10, 2005.  If the licenses gain broad 
acceptance, then it could create a shared equilibrium for the patents held by those entities. 
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IV. The Effect of Commercialized Open Source 
A.  Effect on Industry Organization and Innovation 
If the ultimate effect of the “property-preempting investments” described above 
really is a shift in the enforcement equilibrium to bring open source programs under the 
shelter of some of the existing large-firm portfolios, then it is hard to accept the open 
source phenomenon as a fundamental weakening of the IP system.  That is not to say, 
however, that the rise of open source will not affect innovation in the industry.  Recent 
literature on the relation between IP and industrial organization provides a strong 
theoretical basis110 for expecting that the prevailing open source business models will 
have consequences for the location of innovation.111 As Tim Wu explains, there is good 
reason to think that this kind of effect – an effect on the “decision architecture” of an 
industry – often will be a more important effect of intellectual property rights than a 
direct effect on competition caused by exploitation of the right to exclude.112 
I start with the theory articulated by Ashish Arora and his coauthors that a 
stronger IP system often leads to smaller and more specialized firms.113 Generally, they 
reason, strong IP rights encourage investment in specialized firms with a superior ability 
to innovate, largely because strong IP rights limit the costs of leakage that occurs when 
the locus of innovation is beyond a firm’s boundaries.114 Conversely, they argue, a 
weaker IP system makes it more difficult to protect proprietary technology and thus 
prompts the creation of larger firms and industry consolidation.115 The effect is 
particularly salient with technologically intensive inputs, and leads to investments in 
smaller specialized firms over vertically integrated firms.  Research in the chemical 
 
110 In addition to the I/O literature that I discuss below, Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence 
Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1215 (2005), reports 
empirical evidence that stronger IP systems influence the direction of innovation.  Although there 
obviously are numerous potentially overdetermining factors, the recent history of the software industry 
arguably bears out this point, where we have seen a great deal of innovation at the same time that software 
patents became easier to obtain. 
111 It is difficult to quantify the effect of stronger or weaker intellectual property systems on levels of 
innovation.  As I explain in Mann, supra note 1, we can say that the levels of innovation in the software 
industry seem quite high, with R&D intensities greater than in most other industries during the last decade.  
My point here is simply that the rise of open source is likely to affect the location and dispersion of that 
innovation. 
112 Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2006). 
113 Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for 
Technology Licensing (unpublished Dec. 16, 2004 manuscript); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, 
Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and R&D Input (unpublished 2001 manuscript); Ashish Arora & Robert 
P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 
451 (2004).   
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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industry (by Arora) and semiconductor industry (by Hall and Ziedonis) provides 
empirical support for that possibility.116 
The theory that Arora and his co-authors have articulated has obvious applications 
to the software industry.  This is the best example of an industry in which innovation is 
cumulative, i.e., one in which many firms are attempting to build new products that use 
the same set of cutting-edge ideas.  Thus, a fragmented structure can provide multiple 
opportunities for solutions to difficult technological problems.  This is surely part of the 
explanation for evidence suggesting that small firms can be more innovative than large 
firms. 
It is also plainly the case that use of property rights to codify the output from 
research and development makes it much easier for firms of differing sizes and research 
emphases to settle into a cross-licensing equilibrium.  Without some form of protection, it 
would be difficult to force participants in the industry to come to terms regarding how 
much they should contribute to agreements with their various cross-licensing partners, or 
to exclude from the equilibrium firms that do not contribute their share of innovation. 
Applied to the software industry, it is apparent that as property rights were 
strengthened in the mid-1990’s, the industry became increasingly fragmented.  This 
suggests at least a possibility that the fragmentation has supported a higher rate of 
innovation than otherwise would have existed.  The natural question, then, is whether 
open source will alter the characteristics that have led to the existing structure.  There are 
good reasons to think – as paradoxical as it might seem – that the rise of open source will 
support industry consolidation, not fragmentation.117 At bottom, this is because the 
business models that are most likely to succeed in connection with open source 
development are business models that work better for larger firms. 
The first point relates to credibility.  A fundamental distinction between open 
source and proprietary software is the ambiguity of the sponsor of the program.  For 
proprietary software products, a specific company typically owns, develops, maintains, 
and supports the program.  The purchase of a proprietary software product is, for the 
most part, a bet that a specific and plainly identifiable company will stand behind the 
 
116 Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry (unpublished April 
1996 manuscript); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 
(2001); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me in: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent 
Acquisition Strategies of Firms (January 2004 draft). 
117 Although it cannot be measured, it may also have implications for the level of innovation.  My sense is 
that corporate participation in the movement—whether or not it succeeds—reflects the fact that the industry 
has matured to the point that the level of  innovation has caught up or is catching up to the needs of users.  
If innovation is viewed as the commercialization of basic research (perhaps, here, the Internet), then there 
would be a period of rapid fragmentation and innovation – until the number of possible ways to 
commercialize the technologies begins to stabilize – followed by a reconsolidation of firms, a lessening of 
the pace of innovation, and a focus on the efficient delivery of well-defined products and services.  At that 
point, we might expect major breakthroughs to come from academia, government and R&D divisions of 
large firms until some new “transformative need” is identified or satisfied. 
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product in a number of important ways.  Three of the most important are that the 
developer will repair flaws in the product promptly; that it will upgrade the product to 
account for new technological developments; and (most importantly for my analysis) that 
it will protect users from claims that use of the product infringes the IP rights of third 
parties.118 
It may be that proprietary software developers do not often incur ironclad 
contractual obligations on all of those points.  Yet whatever their contracts might say, 
they certainly have considerable residual legal responsibility for those problems.  
Moreover, in the reputational marketplace in which software vendors compete for 
customers, there is a powerful motivation for a software developer to accept 
responsibility for serious problems related to its software, without regard to the details of 
its anticipated legal responsibility for those problems. 
In contrast, the situation is considerably more complex for open source software.  
For one thing, the licenses that govern open source software differ from the licenses that 
govern proprietary software in that the authors of the software are likely to categorically 
disclaim responsibility for the kinds of problems discussed above.119 That makes some 
sense given the nature of the software’s development, where specific contributions are 
made by individuals that cannot expect to use profits from the sale of the software to 
defray anticipated liabilities that might arise from its distribution and use.  Moreover, 
interviews with industry executives suggest that even the proprietary companies that 
operate in the open source community almost uniformly disclaim any legal responsibility 
for problems with the software. 
What that means is that any response to users’ problems with open source 
software is likely to come from a reputational constraint rather than some enforceable 
legal obligation.  It is, of course, much more difficult for a business to assess the 
reliability of a reputational constraint than a legal obligation.  Yet it cannot be rational for 
a business to adopt an open source software platform without satisfying itself that 
somebody will maintain, upgrade, and defend the software.120 
The most obvious generality must be that a reputational constraint will be more 
robust for a large and publicly visible firm than it is for a small and emerging one.  
Detractors of open source software often argue that it is risky for a business to rely on 
those kinds of constraints for important software purchases.  I have no occasion to assess 
the plausibility of that argument – my point here is simply that a rational business would 
find it much easier to overcome that concern when the open source software is closely 
associated with a large and publicly visible firm than when the software is associated 
 
118 Unlike copyright law, which does not control “use” of a copyright work, a patent controls any use of the 
patented technology. 
119 E.g., Apache License §§ 7-8; BSD ¶2; CDDL § 5; GPL §§ 11-12; MPL § 9.   As discussed above, the 
warranty of provenance that appears in a few of the more recently drafted open source licenses is the most 
important qualification to the assertion in the text. 
120 Fink, supra note 84; Weiser, supra note 3. 
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with a smaller or younger firm.  It is no accident that open source’s commercial success 
has risen rapidly since IBM’s public embrace of Apache and Linux at the beginning of 
this decade.  So, for example, assuming products of similar quality, it seems plain that 
even a relatively small publicly traded firm like Pervasive would have an advantage in 
finding customers for an open-source database product over smaller startup firms 
purveying similar products (like Green Plum). 
The second point relates to the distinction between products and services firms.  
As discussed above, the open source model leans ineluctably toward services firms, 
particularly when the underlying open source project is governed by the GPL.  Thus, the 
open source model tends to lead to a population of services firms customizing and 
integrating software and hardware for enterprise customers, while the proprietary model 
more often leads to a set of products firms selling off-the-shelf products that may trade 
off specialized functionality for ease of installation and maintenance.  This is of course a 
generalization – there are open-source products firms (like MontaVista and the startups 
discussed above) and important proprietary services firms.  But the constraints of the 
business model do press open source firms toward the services end of the spectrum more 
forcefully than they do proprietary firms. 
To the extent that this theory is true, the open source model should in turn support 
larger firms because larger firms have a comparative advantage in the service sectors of 
the software industry.  A few overlapping reasons give rise to this comparative 
advantage.  First, the VC startup model works much better for products firms than it does 
for services firms;121 thus, there will be relatively few startup services firms.122 Second, 
there is good reason to think that the property rights granted by patents will be uniquely 
valuable to firms attempting to progress successfully through the venture-backed stage.123 
The comparative advantage continues throughout the business cycle.  Just as the 
products model is better suited to the venture-backed financing common for startups, 
large established firms will have an advantage in service sectors.124 For one thing, large 
incumbent firms are simply going to be better at the integrative services model 
epitomized by IBM.  The “not flashy, just fully informed” business is nearly always 
going to be the large established firm, not the destructive innovator.  For another, as I 
heard repeatedly in interviews, there are considerable economies of scale in providing the 
 
121 Cusumano, supra note 7.   
122 Mann, supra note 1; Mann & Sager, supra note 1. 
123 Mann, supra note 1; Mann & Sager, supra note 1.  That relation is affected by the point in my 
forthcoming paper with John Allison and Abe Dunn, presenting empirical evidence that patents are more 
commonly used by products firms than by services firms. 
124 Subscription sales carry high margins in the range of 88-89%.  Services sales carry much lower margins, 
in the range of 43-44%.   In addition, although services revenues have remained relatively flat, subscription 
revenues skyrocketed in 2004 when Red Hat sold approximately 169,500 subscriptions to RHEL products 
compared to 36,500 in the previous year.  Novell seems to be entering a similar phase, with much higher 
margins on software licenses than on services (90% versus 50% in 2002), but steeper declines in licensing 
sales.  It remains to be seen whether Novell’s accelerating shift to a Linux platform can stem the decline. 
Open Source and Property Rights February 16, 2006 Draft 33
33
kind of 24/7 quick-response service that large corporations expect from their software 
providers: it is much harder for a startup with three customers to support that kind of 
infrastructure than a larger company with dozens (or hundreds) of customers to support. 
Red Hat is perhaps the best example of this.  After raising $13 million from 
venture capitalists and strategic investors in 1998 and early 1999, Red Hat raised $84 
million in an August 1999 IPO.  However, even Red Hat was unable to achieve 
profitability using a traditional services model coupled with a pure open-source product.  
Red Hat never turned a profit until its decision in 2002 to split its product line between 
the slow-changing Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), which comes with certifications, 
long-term guarantees for support and bug fixes, and a mandatory per-computer price tag; 
and the fast-changing Fedora, which is free, uncertified, relatively unsupported, and 
packed with the latest upgrades.  Selling annual subscriptions to RHEL helped push Red 
Hat into profitability for the first time in 2004.125 
More generally, we could say that a property rights system favors new entrants 
because large firms can use other tools related to their market power to continue to grow 
(leveraging products against other products, leveraging services against products, 
marketing advantages, etc.).  Small firms have nowhere to turn except property 
rights.  More pointedly, it is much easier for a small startup to pursue an idea to the point 
of having a solid patent or set of patents sufficient to protect the idea from competitors 
than it is to develop the kind of brand identification and market power that would make it 
a strong competitor against the large incumbent firms in the industry.  In substance (as 
Figure One suggests), this is a basic distinction in the types of appropriation mechanisms 
that are useful for different types of firms. 
FIGURE ONE: APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS 
SMALLER FIRMS LARGER FIRMS 
First-Mover Advantage Market Power 
 Patents Brand Identification 
 Leveraging Value Chains 
 
From this perspective, what open source does, in the sectors where it succeeds, is 
to remove from the market firms that are developing discrete products from which they 
wish to get revenues.126 So we see that a fuller vision of open source reveals a great 
interconnection, if not outright dependence, on proprietary property rights, and the 
 
125 See Dwight Johnson, Venture Capital Invested in Red Hat, Linux Journal, Dec. 01, 1998, available at 
http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/3171; Stephen Shankland, Red Hat Shares Triple in IPO, CNET, Aug. 
11, 1999; Red Hat 10-K (May 16 2005)  
126 The point can be pressed too far.  As discussed above, there is some reason to think that open-source 
software can be a useful input for proprietary products startups, by decreasing the costs of completing a 
marketable product and helping firms to focus their development expenditures on the portions of their 
product that are uniquely differentiating.  Those firms, of course, depend directly on the property rights in 
the products that they sell. 
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potential that it might support a substantial shift in the dispersion of innovation in the 
industry.  Thus, it is open source, and not patents, that pose the biggest threat to the 
“polyarchic” decision structure under which the software industry has flourished for the 
last decade.127 
Taking the point further, it is possible that open source might disrupt not only the 
ability of small firms to grow and innovate, it also might disrupt the relatively stable 
equilibrium under which the industry has grown in the last several years.128 The legal 
dispute over Linux plainly has the potential to disrupt the distribution of Linux-related 
products and services.129 Open source still has many unanswered questions: What 
happens if one of the many individual contributors to an open source program provides 
even a few lines of code that contain the trade secrets of another firm?  Or that infringe 
another firm’s copyright or patent?  Would removal of the infringing lines be an adequate 
response?  Or would a court enjoin distribution of the entire program?  Or require the 
payment of substantial damages by any and all of the many users of the program? 
Thus, we see the industry at a turning point.  The rapid growth of property rights 
in the industry over the last decade has had a relatively benign effect so far, largely 
because of the relatively stable equilibrium that has prevailed until now.130 But can the 
open source business models discussed above grow to maturity without collapsing that 
equilibrium?  Will one method of development or the other prevail so completely as to 
dominate the industry?   
Some of those questions are directly at issue in the SCO litigation.  Others are 
implicit.  For example, the case directly raises the possibility that a court might hold the 
GPL unenforceable.131 Does it create a binding contract?132 Will it be enforced as 
written?  Will anyone who distributes open source software be forever barred from 
enforcing property rights?  And, will large patentees such as IBM use their patents as a 
 
127 I take the term from Wu, supra note 112. 
128 Mann, supra note 1; Mann & Sager, supra note 1.   
129 SCO’s lawsuit contends that IBM obtained information concerning the UNIX source code and 
derivative works from SCO and inappropriately used and distributed that information in connection with its 
efforts to promote Linux.  IBM has responded vigorously, claiming that SCO does not have the right to 
assert claims based on UNIX ownership, that SCO has breached the GPL, and that SCO has infringed 
certain patents owned by IBM.  Although early news reports predicted that the lawsuit would harm Linux, 
others have now claimed that the suit actually has helped Linux by accelerating its popularity and legal 
foundation.    Stuart Cohen, How SCO’s Threats Rallied Linux, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2005, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2005/tc2005027_4780.htm. For a 
discussion of the murky history of IP rights in UNIX as resolved in the AT&T/Berkeley litigation, see 
Weber, supra note 3, at 49-52. 
130 Mann, supra note 1; Mann & Sager, supra note 1.   
131 For a recent decision holding it enforceable, see In re Welte, No. 21 O 6123/04 (Dist. Ct. of Munich 
May 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/ecommerce/2nd/assignments/25/Munich%20GPL%20Decision.pdf.
132 See Rosen, supra note 3, for a cogent discussion of that issue. 
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club to protect just Linux or will those protections extend to other open source programs?  
The way the industry is responding to those unsettled questions is fascinating; the 
answers will likely reveal the direction of the industry in the years to come. 
Another important question is the significance of the various development 
communities arising in the open source space.  If large firms take over much of the open 
source software, what will happen to those communities?  Richard Epstein, for example, 
pointedly questions whether loose networks of affiliated firms can survive without the 
corporate governance structures that support the single-firm models.133 His question, 
applied to open source communities, raises two related points.   
The first point relates to the licenses.  In the current environment, at least, there is 
some reason to be concerned about the stability of the existing licenses, and in particular, 
the stability of communities built on reciprocal licenses like the GPL.  As discussed 
above, reciprocal licenses like the GPL134 impose greater restrictions on the ability of 
proprietary firms to integrate their products with open source code than academic licenses 
or many of the more recently developed commercial licenses.  For the outsider, it is 
difficult to assess the significance of that point.  Thus, it is clear from the interviews I 
conducted that sophisticated developers can use techniques to write programs that are 
adequately functional and yet technically maintain the separation from the operating 
system’s kernel that is necessary to avoid “infection” by the GPL license.  What is not 
clear, however, is how much effort is required for engineers of less than complete 
sophistication to invent or master those techniques.  The interviews leave me with the 
strong impression that this is a serious problem for all but the most elite organizations.  
This suggests a minor point of some irony – that increasing (or decreasing) use of the 
GPL interacts with a relative advantage that larger companies have in working on the 
fringes of GPL projects. 
The second point is that the type of license will likely have some effect on the 
type of software firm that effectively can use the project.  For example, it is widely 
recognized that a more lenient license permits more third-party development.135 Previous 
scholars have not focused, however, on the likely effects that differing licenses have on 
the types of third-party development.  A strong reciprocal license (like the GPL) works 
fine for a services firm.  A firm that profits from services should be relatively agnostic 
about the commoditization of the software that their customers buy.136 Indeed, they 
should prefer Linux to the extent that Linux is more of a hybrid product than competing 
 
133 Richard A. Epstein, Why Open Source Is Unsustainable, Financial Times, Oct. 21, 2004, available at 
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/78d9812a-2386-11d9-aee5-00000e2511c8,ft_acl=,s01=1.html (last visited 
January 28, 2005). 
134 It is clear that a substantial part of the concern about the GPL relates to its ambiguity rather than its 
substantive terms standing alone.  E.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software 
Licensing, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, 83-92 (2002).  Whether that can be solved by reversioning is yet another 
difficult question for the communities that rely on that license. 
135 Weber, supra note 3. 
136 Cusumano, supra note 7. 
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proprietary products – thereby shifting a greater share of the cost of ownership to services 
related to installation and integration.  Thus, for example, firms like Cygnus Solutions, 
Linuxcare, Turbolinux, and Red Hat have developed business models for selling 
consulting and services related to Linux software.  VA Linux, like IBM, sells both 
consulting services and servers. 
In contrast to services firms, it is much easier for a products firm to operate in an 
environment with a less restrictive license (like Apache or a BSD-space).  Thus, small 
firms like Covalent and Gluecode develop proprietary software that is designed to operate 
with Apache software.  More importantly, some of the most highly visible and successful 
proprietary software products have been built on top of code covered by such licenses.  
The most prominent example of course is IBM’s WebSphere program, discussed above, 
which is built on and interacts directly with the Apache Web server.  More recently, 
Apple’s widely acclaimed new operating system – OS X – rests on top of a BSD-licensed 
operating system (FreeBSD 3.2): Apple has layered its popular graphic user interface 
(GUI) onto the UNIX style open source operating system.  Executives with whom I 
discussed that subject pointed to this as one of the most perceptive executions of a core 
competency strategy: Apple maintains control of the GUI that gives its products so much 
verve in the marketplace, but takes advantage of the commoditized operating system 
available from the open source community. 
As the commercialization of the open source model proceeds, the pressure placed 
on the GPL will necessarily increase.  If it turns out that it is important in the marketplace 
for there to be proprietary products more closely related to the Linux kernel than the GPL 
permits, the open source movement will confront a contracting crisis in which the 
software must suffer in functionality unless the GPL can be revised to accommodate 
those concerns.  As Epstein notes, that is the scenario that poses the greatest challenge to 
the decentralized development model: the lack of a single control point makes a 
substantial shift in direction more difficult than it is for a proprietary firm.137 The Linux 
community is aware of the problem, as it enters a period of “reversioning” designed to 
promulgate a new version of the GPL that would cover subsequent distributions of 
Linux.138 The inability of Mozilla to pass through reversioning successfully makes this 
process an important one for the open source communities: can they develop the 
institutional structures to modify the contracts successfully (as they hope) or will they be 
forced periodically to start over (as Firefox has done for the most part in the browser 
market)?  Long-term commercial success probably depends on the ability of the 
proponents of Linux to persuade users that they will not need to start over simply to 
resolve licensing problems. 
Beyond those short term problems lurk longer-term problems.  Academics 
commonly have noted the apparent incongruity in the large-scale voluntary efforts of 
open source contributors to develop commercially valuable software.139 A sophisticated 
 
137 Epstein, supra note 133. 
138 See supra note 97. 
139 Benkler, supra note 41. 
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literature offers a variety of reasons why individuals might make such contributions.140 
As commercialization proceeds, however, and firms justify their contributions by 
reference to the kinds of value-chain motivations discussed above, there is a risk that 
long-term shifts in market structure will cause those motivations to dissipate.  For 
example, it makes sense in current conditions for all of the various players in the OSDL 
group to make substantial contributions of personnel, technology, and resources to Linux 
development.  However, as the market shifts and different firms gain dominance, there 
always is the possibility that the community capable of profiting from Linux-related 
products may contract (just as it might grow).  Thus, Dell recently withdrew from OSDL, 
apparently (according to comments in my interviews) concluding that the markets in 
which it could exploit its core capabilities were not sufficiently related to Linux products 
to justify continued contributions. 
This is, at its core, a classic free-rider problem: if some of the contributors are 
profiting from value-chain investments in Linux and others are not, why shouldn’t those 
who are not profiting (or are profiting less) withdraw from the process (or diminish their 
contributions).  Once that process begins, it might rapidly reach a tipping point where 
commercial contributions became limited to a relatively small number of firms. 
Broader concerns relate to the continuing efforts of firms to use the contracts that 
organize their communities to design novel and specialized types of communities – just 
as the real-estate developer uses covenants and restrictions to erect a particular set of 
property rights tailor-made to a particular subdivision.  Existing practices suggest a 
spectrum ranging from complete enclosure in a single firm to open access to all.141 
The first step along this spectrum is the proprietary development system, 
exemplified by Apple’s desktop computers, which traditionally have used an operating 
system with a completely proprietary interface that allows Apple to control not only the 
basic products, but also the applications and utilities that interact with those products.  
The vigor of that model is consistent with the 2004 dispute between Apple and Real 
Networks over Real’s efforts to develop software compatible with Apple’s highly 
successful iPod.  That development model has allowed Apple to develop products that 
many users regard as the ultimate in functionality and ease of integration, though it of 
course has had drawbacks in limiting the size of the development community that 
produces applications for those products.142 
The second step is proprietary development with an open interface.  Microsoft’s 
products typically have joined closely guarded proprietary code with relatively easy 
access to interfaces, allowing third parties to develop compatible products.  That model 
has given Microsoft strong market power in the market for operating systems and office 
applications for desktop computers, both because of Microsoft’s enormous investments in 
 
140 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 42.   
141 See Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003) 
(suggesting that this is a foundational distinction).   
142 Lichtman, supra note 22. 
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continuing development of its software and because of the substantial community of 
third-party developers whose products have extended the functionality of Microsoft’s 
software. 
A third step is a gated community.  A good example from my interviews appears 
in the context of semiconductor development.  In that industry, there are two substantial 
competing camps of research and development.  Intel of course leads one of them.  The 
other is a consortium of researchers from IBM, Advanced Micro Devices, and others.  All 
members of the consortium contribute funds and personnel, and gain access to a pooled 
set of IP, but the IP is not available to nonmembers (which is to say, Intel).  Industry 
executives praised the success of this development model, which has produced 
technology commensurate with Intel’s technology at a much lower cost.  Although this 
type of community is formally proprietary, the practical import is quite similar to the 
modern commercial open source community.  As discussed above, the patent licenses 
typically offered by open source contributors are so carefully restricted as to limit the 
freedom of outsiders to use the technology or take it in directions contrary to the wishes 
of the sponsors and major contributors. 
The final step on the spectrum is the wholly open community, characterized (at 
least in theory)143 by the Linux community governed by the GPL.  The business case for 
this community is openly one of collaborative development.  As suggested above, that 
model offers benefits both from the cost savings of collaborative development and from 
the technological gains of collaborative rather than one-shop development.144 
It is clear that major market players are constantly developing new consortia, on a 
case-by-case basis, which reflect different structures for investment in and access to 
technology, tailored to different user markets.  At the most simplistic level, development 
at the proprietary end of the spectrum is more suited for products aimed at individuals, 
such as desktop applications, where ease of installation and network effects are integral to 
market penetration.  At the opposite end, wholly open solutions often are attractive for 
applications targeted at sophisticated users in enterprise settings where factors like total 
cost of ownership and specialized integration with other systems are more important than 
ease of installation.  As those structures become increasingly specialized and numerous, 
will their informality be able to survive?  As the discussion above suggests, any number 
of events could destabilize those communities – a tipping toward the technology of a 
particular partner, or an incendiary assertion of property rights by somebody outside the 
community. 
B. Effect on Intellectual Property Rights 
 
143 Given the implied nature of the GPL patent license, there is as I have explained a great deal of doubt as 
to exactly how free users are to take and modify Linux.  I take it as a practical reality, however, that the 
contributors with patent rights in that area are unlikely to enforce them against users or modifiers of Linux. 
144 Chesbrough, supra note 77. 
Open Source and Property Rights February 16, 2006 Draft 39
39
The most pointed question is the importance of property rights in the years to 
come.  There are some contractual efforts to limit the importance of those claims.  For 
example, firms like Microsoft and HP have begun to indemnify their users from potential 
infringement claims.145 Others have begun to offer insurance policies.146 Similarly, one 
of the distinguishing features of the subscription models that are developing for open-
source products is contractual provisions that protect customers from IP claims related to 
the open-source product.147 As discussed above, still others are promising not to enforce 
existing property rights, or (at least implicitly) promising to enforce existing property 
rights to harm those who threaten the movement. 
Still, most agree that it is necessary to acquire more patents to play the game.  
Hence, it is relevant that the major corporate members of the OSDL group continue to 
make heavy investments in patented technology: IBM and HP, for example have both 
recently been obtaining new software patents at a pace of more than 1000 patents/year.  
Similarly, press reports suggest that pure open source firms increasingly are attempting to 
acquire their own patents, primarily to protect themselves against the threat of 
litigation.148 There may have been a time when the open source community was 
dominated by a political motivation not to obtain software patents, but that time is fading 
rapidly into the past.  In addition, it is worth noting that most software patents are issued 
to firms outside the industry.149 There is no reason to think that an increase – or decrease 
– in collaborative development in the software industry will have a substantial effect on 
the propensity of firms outside the industry to obtain patents. 
Finally, and most fundamentally, it is not clear that the models of the corporate 
participants (like the OSDL group) would work without the internalization of R&D rights 
that patents facilitate.  If much of the participation of proprietary firms in open source 
development is motivated by “value-chain” returns – i.e., firms accepting (or fostering) 
commoditization at one point of a value chain at the same time they attempt to stake out a 
profitable point of competency elsewhere on the set of products and services their 
 
145 Microsoft offers a broad protection against infringement claims based on its products.  Stacey 
Higginbotham, How Open?  That’s the Big Patent Question, The Deal.Com, Sept. 25, 2005.  Hewlett-
Packard’s indemnification plan protects against SCO attacks.  Similarly, Red Hat offers a warranty to 
replace any infringing code.  Novell offers some legal indemnification against copyright infringement 
claims brought against Linux server software customers, and has threatened to use its patent portfolio to 
defend patent claims brought against itself or one of its customers involving its open source products.  
Stephen Shankland, Novell Offers Legal Protection for Linux, Jan. 13, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/Novell+offers+legal+protection+for+Linux/2100-7344_3-5139632.html?tag=nl.
146 This is the business model of Open Source Risk Management.  As I write, that company is in advanced 
negotiations under which Lloyds would underwrite offer insurance against claims of copyright 
infringement through the use of Linux.  Ingrid Marson, Lloyd’s May Offer Open-Source Indemnity, Aug. 
15, 2005, available at http://news.com.com/Lloyds+may+offer+open-source+indemnity/2100-7344_3-
5833077.html?tag=sas.email.
147 Examples here from my interviews would be firms like MySQL, Pervasive, and Red Hat. 
148 E.g., Joe Brockmeier, Red Hat Acquiring Netscape Enterprise Solutions Software, lwn.net, Oct. 6, 2004 
149 James Bessen & Robert Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents (Mar. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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customers use – then patents presumably will be just as important (if not more so) in the 
remaining core areas in which those firms are attempting to differentiate themselves.  
Thus, IBM’s willingness to refrain from enforcing some of its patents against open source 
developers does not carry with it a willingness to forgo the use of IP to protect its 
proprietary products like WebSphere.  It may be that patents are less useful for the 
services portion of IBM’s business than they are for its products or hardware sectors, but 
there is little reason to believe that any of those lines of activity would benefit from the 
removal of patent protection.  Nor has Sun granted free access to its portfolio – it has 
granted only the patent rights necessary for the use of the specific program that it has 
contributed to the open source community. 
The core issue, I think, is the question of the significance of the threat of patent 
infringement litigation.  The mere threat has had numerous effects, ranging from the 
contractual assurances discussed above, to some difficult-to-gauge disruption of Linux 
adoption.  There also have been a number of events suggesting the possibility that large 
firms not participating in open source value chains might exploit their portfolio against 
those that are participating in those value chains.150 It is not clear, however, that the 
enforcement risk in fact is substantial.  First and most important, to date the risk remains 
only hypothetical: there has not yet been a patent infringement suit filed challenging the 
use or development of Linux or any other open source program of which I am aware. 
Second, the risk of litigation is easily overstated.  The basic concern is as follows: 
(I) that there are literally thousands of existing software patents that cover the subjects of 
open source software programs – perhaps 10,000 patents that cover operating systems 
alone; (II) that open source communities as a matter of disdain for the practices of 
proprietary firms do not sully themselves with obtaining patents; (III) that infringement 
by open source products is more detectable than infringement by proprietary products, 
because the source code will more directly display the algorithm of the software; and thus 
(IV) that users of open source software are at a substantial risk of liability for patent 
infringement.151 A prominent study by Open Source Risk Management (OSRM), for 
example, concluded that the Linux kernel infringes 283 currently issued patents.152 The 
OSRM business model, however, is predicated on the seriousness of that risk, which 
makes it difficult to weigh the credibility of its study.  
Two points make me doubt the significance of the patent infringement threat.  The 
first and most important is the limited usefulness of patents as a tool for appropriating 
innovations in software.  As I explain in detail in a related paper, most patents on 
software innovations are not sufficiently robust to prevent competitors from developing 
non-infringing programs that include the functionality of the innovation represented by 
 
150 The most salient event here probably is the controversy over Sun’s willingness to enter into a cross-
licensing agreement with Microsoft that extends protection from Microsoft’s portfolio to Sun’s proprietary 
products but not to OpenOffice. 
151 Zittrain, supra note 79. 
152 Sean Michael Kerner, Linux’s Patent Risk (Aug 2, 2004), available at www.Internetnews.com (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2004). 
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the patent.153 This is true for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the 
pattern of software innovation that provides multiple paths to most design problems.   
The second, related, point is the fact that at least some of the largest firms in the 
industry have patent-reviewing practices that undermine the possibility and extent of 
interference from issued patents.  Executives at more than one of the firms with whom I 
spoke indicated that they have routine programs that monitor patents as they are issued, 
watching for patents that might write onto products of the firm.  It is common for the 
lawyers in these programs to discover such patents, and for the firms to respond promptly 
to alleviate the problem.  Depending on the seriousness of the problem, a range of 
obvious responses appear: ignore the patent, on the premise that it is either invalid or 
does not extend to the product in question; rewrite the software to avoid the patent; obtain 
a license from the patentee; or acquire the patentee (or the patent). 
It seems clear that all of these responses (and more complex combinations of 
them) are common in the industry.  It also is clear that the OSDL group engages in 
similar activity with respect to commercially significant open source programs like Linux 
and Apache.  Collectively, those two points undermine step (IV) of the syllogism above, 
because they suggest that however many patents there might be that affect commercially 
important open source programs, the likelihood of a serious problem of infringement is 
relatively slight. 
Still, it is at least plausible that there are patents that might pose problems for 
open source programs.154 One highly informed executive, for example, suggested that 
there are about 200 crucial patents, access to which is necessary to distribute a modern 
operating system.  Although that estimate seems quite high, even a much lower estimate 
would suggest a serious potential for infringement by open source programs that do not 
have access to patented technology.  Here, however, is where step (II) of the syllogism 
breaks down.  As discussed above, the “disdain” argument no longer has any descriptive 
force for the modern open source development community.  Whatever might be true for 
the “hard-core” portions of the community associated with the Free Software Foundation, 
nothing could be further from the truth for players like the OSDL group that are fostering 
the commercially important open source programs.  There is every reason to believe that 
those firms will make their patents available to the extent necessary to protect users of 
open source software.  Indeed, one executive at an OSDL firm suggested that a relatively 
common response to the issuance of a third-party patent that affects Linux is for a 
member of the OSDL group to grant formal access to a patent necessary to write around 
the third-party patent. 
 
153 Mann, supra note 1. 
154 Perhaps the most significant event to date on that front is Kodak’s recent successful lawsuit against Sun 
claiming that Sun’s Java technology infringed aged Kodak patents inherited from Wang Laboratories.  
Industry observers worry that the basic operations at issue in the litigation are used in a variety of existing 
open source products, which thus could be vulnerable to similar challenges by Kodak.  Given Kodak’s 
relatively poor market position in its major existing business models, Kodak has not that much more to lose 
by aggressive litigation here than SCO does. 
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With that information in mind, we might think that the likelihood of a risk of 
infringement is about as serious for the commercially important proprietary products 
(from firms like Microsoft and Adobe) as it is for open source products.  In either case, 
the problem will be serious only if the two camps go into an open war enforcing their 
patents against each other – an outcome that seems most unlikely under current 
conditions, for reasons explained in a related paper155 – or if a party such as a troll that is 
outside the existing equilibrium holds the patent.  In sum, it certainly is plausible that a 
troll could obtain a “nuclear bomb” patent that would write onto major commercial 
software platforms.  It is hard to say, clear, however, that Linux is categorically more 
vulnerable to such an attack than Windows, if only because the OSDL group collectively 
has many more patents with which to justify its activities than any single developer of 
proprietary products (even Microsoft).  A single shared pool among all in the industry 
might resist such an attack more readily than the silos of patents that currently exist, but it 
is not obvious that one or the other silo is less capable of protecting itself. 
V. Conclusion 
Some academics see the open source movement as a victim of an excessive IP 
system and fear that it cannot co-exist with the commercial development model, which 
depends on increasingly large patent portfolios.  Others see it as the best antidote for a 
broken IP system and hope that it will force software firms to gravitate towards business 
models that do not rely on IP protections, even if those models provide lower returns.  
Still others see the movement as a case study on the unsuitability of traditional 
development models that depend on appropriating the returns to R&D through IP 
investments and predict the abandonment of IP-centric development models. 
This essay fleshes out those ideas and tests their limits.  The foundational claim of 
this paper is that the open source model is largely consistent with current economic 
theories about optimal ways of leveraging R&D to serve the distinct needs of different 
end-user markets.  I argue that commercial participants form collaborative development 
communities that mirror the more typical firm-based development processes that depend 
directly on off-the-shelf IP rules.  They do this when it is more efficient to invest in inter-
firm innovative activities, and they use traditional appropriation mechanisms when intra-
firm activities make more sense. 
It is difficult to assess whether either model would be more successful without the 
influence of the other.  Given the lower returns experienced by some of the commercial 
participants, there is some reason to believe that firms are being drawn to open source 
development as a second-best outcome: as it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain 
competitive differentiation with a traditional development structure, open source offers a 
promising alternative tactic.  The ongoing strategic repositioning renders the structure of 
the industry far too fluid to assess that point fully at this time.  The most that can be said 
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is that there is every reason to believe that the optimal allocation of the different models 
depends on the specific technology and markets involved. 
Similarly, although the open source model seems to have much to lose from the 
patent system, it is far from clear that it would work without it.  Many of the principal 
participants are large patentees.  Those firms continue to develop proprietary hardware 
and software products.   Patents are an important way to protect the underlying R&D 
investments, and increasingly are used to generate licensing revenues.  The open source 
movement, in turn, depends heavily on the involvement of commercial participants for 
legitimacy in the eyes of enterprise users. 
In the end, it seems certain that the different models will be forced to co-exist, in a 
world in which property rights will continue to matter.  In addition, if they continue to co-
exist, the industry will develop in a different shape than it would without the two models.  
I argue here that the industry will be more concentrated and harder to enter.  I may be 
wrong about that.  But if I am right, the rise of commercial open source will have an 
effect far different from the vision of its creators. 
 
